Companies

Each Wednesday I write my ValueLine column for Alan Kohler’s Eureka Report. Usually I post a link to my article the following day here at the blog. This week Alan has generously allowed me to republish my insights. Visit the Eureka Report website, www.eurekareport.com for more details about Alan’s newsletter.

ValueLine: Carsales.com

Ever noticed that the biggest and best online businesses are lists? Lists of websites, lists of houses, lists of flights, lists of jobs, lists of hotel rooms … even lists of people!

The business of curating and providing lists can be an extremely lucrative one because there is no need for a warehouse or a manufacturing plant. Nor is there a need for inventory and there is potentially very little maintenance spending required.

But because anyone with access to a server and knowledge of a programming language can imitate the business model, what is needed to be successful is a sustainable competitive advantage. More about that in a moment.

Last year nearly one million cars were sold in Australia; this year the figure is expected to be even higher. Of Australia’s adult population of 19.3 million, 5.3% buy a new car every year. Excluding January sales (when everyone is on holidays) and June sales (with end of financial year run-outs) about 85,000 new cars are sold each month.

That’s a lot of new cars being bought, and one suspects that just as many second hand-cars being sold too. One company leveraged to this industry without having to buy stock, lease a showroom or pay the wages of mechanics is Carsales.com (CRZ).

After a decade of business under private ownership, Carsales.com was floated at $3.50 a share in September 2009 in one of the most highly anticipated listings of the year. As is often the case with such floats, very few retail investors were able to get an allocation.

Today Carsales (CRZ) is Australia’s largest online list of cars, with about 205,000 units available for sale as of June this year.

For the year to June 2010, Carsales reported a profit of $43.2 million, which was $16.8 million less than listed car dealership Automotive Holdings (AHE). Automotive Holdings reported a profit of $60 million but required $1 billion of assets and $376 million of equity to produce it.

By way of comparison, Carsales required just $114 million of assets and $89 million of equity. Automotive Holdings generated a return on assets of 6.5%; Carsales’ figure was 39%.

If they were your assets, which return would you prefer?

For every dollar of sales, Automotive Holdings generates earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) of 3.8¢. Carsales generates EBITDA of 52¢ from every dollar of sales.

If you could own one of these businesses, which would you prefer?

Carsales dominates Australia’s online lists of cars, capturing roughly half the market. Its next nearest competitor is the Newscorp-owned Carsguide with 93,000 cars for sale at mid-August, followed by the Trading Post with 69,000 cars.

For the full year to June 2010, Carsales’ revenues increased by 28%, with operating costs rising by less than 12% and net profits increasing by over 41%.

One of the keys to sustaining this kind of performance is a competitive advantage and while many conventional reports cite brands and systems as sources of competitive advantage, Carsales’s advantage comes from what is known as the network effect.

This is arguably one of the strongest sources of competitive advantage and it is evident when the value of a service increases for both new and current users as more people begin to use that good or service.

Think about it like this.

As more people list their cars/jobs/properties on a website, more people visit that website because it has the more cars listed. As more people visit the website, it justifies more people listing their cars there and this virtuous circle continues to work in favour of the dominant site, until an unbridgeable moat exists between Carsales.com and the other brands.

In an effort to break the cycle, one of Carsales’ competitors offered vendors the opportunity to list their cars for free but even that failed to put a dent the growth trajectory of Australia’s leading car classifieds website.

Carsales enjoys the same benefits of the network effect as Seek (SEK) does in job ads, REA Group (REA) does in real estate and Wotif (WTF) does in accommodation. This network effect is as visible and obvious as it is entrenched for Carsales.com and investors looking to buy a wonderful business would be hard-pressed to find many more attractive (for more of Roger’s thoughts on web-based businesses, click here).

Now the reality is that Carsales’ largest shareholder, PBL Media, owns 49% of the company and at some point that stake will be sold. But investors fearing the overhang should be less concerned by who buys and sells the shares and more concerned with whether the intrinsic value of the company is rising or not.

Carsales’ intrinsic value is rising. My forecasts suggest intrinsic value will rise 19% for each of the next three years and, let me assure you, there are few companies that can even promise that.

But a rising intrinsic value is just one of the characteristics the ValueLine portfolio seeks. The other is a discount to today’s intrinsic value. And that is the only test that Carsales.com. does not pass.

Carsales.com is an A1 business with a strong competitive advantage that is generating excellent returns on assets but, according to my calculations, its intrinsic value is $3.77. If we compare this to yesterday’s closing price of $4.72, it is approximately 25% overvalued.

In 2012, my estimated intrinsic value for Carsales rises to $4.65 and in 2012 to $5.24, but disciplined value investors need to make sure that everything lines up perfectly to pursue a successful investment strategy.

Carsales is not currently trading at a discount but it is a great business to keep in mind, should the market temporarily change its mind.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 7 October 2010

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Value.able.

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I know of no other book in the world that discusses the concept of calculating future intrinsic values. You may think that is a bold statement, but its true. I have seen many books that claim to reveal Warren Buffett’s intrinsic value formula, but not one that lays out, step-by-step, what investors need to look at to determine whether intrinsic value is rising at a satisfactory rate in the future.

I confess to chuckling recently when one investor told me that they were finding it a little difficult to source the data they needed to calculate future intrinsic values. They also believed that my book lacked an explanation for how to calculate future intrinsic values.

So I asked whether or not they had even thought about future intrinsic values before having read Value.able? Sheepishly, the investor accepted that my book was much more valuable than they had initially concluded and subsequently told other people.

I have not found any other book in the world that has taken that little Buffett quote about finding businesses growing intrinsic value at a “satisfactory rate” and making it part of a clearly explained and defined investing process.

And for those of you who are looking for a reference to forecast equity per share in Value.able…. see Page 188, Step A.

The missing worked example for future equity. It’s easy!

How can you estimate future equity if you don’t have a forecast number such as those readily available in analyst research notes? It’s easy. Take the last known equity per share figure, add the estimated profits, subtract the estimated dividends, add any capital raised through new shares issued and subtract any equity paid back to shareholders through buybacks and you have it.

Here’s an example: In the 2010 annual report for The Reject Shop, equity at 30 June 2010 was $51.543 million (click here to see) and there were 26.034 million shares on issue. Dividing the 2010 ending equity by the shares on issue  ($51.543/26.034) equals equity of $1.98 on a per share basis.

According to Commsec (click here to see), consensus analyst estimates for 2011 earnings per share and dividends per share are $1.028 and $0.744 respectively.

Starting with the 2010 equity per share of $1.98, add the earnings per share of $1.028 and subtract the dividends per share of $0.744 to arrive at an estimated ending equity for 2011 of $2.26. (If you are aware of any shares issued since the end of the financial year, you may want to take the amount raised and divide it by the number of shares issued and then add that result to the $2.26)

Now that you have seen it done, how easy is that?

A global movement begins!

I couldn’t be happier that a small group of passionate Australian value investors are even contemplating future intrinsic values! Nobody in the world is presenting you with estimates for intrinsic values, two, three or four years out and I have never seen any investor ever do it. I know of nobody else in Australia doing that, nobody has written about it before and I haven’t ever come across anyone else in the international business media discussing it either.

And now you are all doing it! It has become part of your vocabulary.

Think about that for a minute… after reading Value.able, investors are now estimating future intrinsic values, posting their estimates at my blog and Facebook page,and  chatting about them online in forums and in boardrooms where previously nobody was.

If before reading Value.able you weren’t discussing future intrinsic values and now you are, then my book has had a positive impact and I am delighted. And all for just $49.95!

Consider how you are now subconsciously framing your investing decisions with future intrinsic values in mind.

Warning!

Don’t blindly combine numbers with Value.able’s valuation tables to produce intrinsic values. As I say in my book, you MUST understand the business and its prospects. I devoted an entire chapter to cash flow and its calculations. Don’t ignore it. I also devoted an entire chapter to competitive advantages. Don’t ignore that either.

Recently, Buffett sold down his holding in Moody’s because it had lost some of its competitive advantage. He isn’t selling because he has recalculated intrinsic value. It’s the competitive advantage that drives the intrinsic value.

Be careful you aren’t so focused on the intrinsic value number that you ignore all the other important factors.

Its one of the reasons I have my Montgomery Quality Ratings (MQRs). They are my own filter to help narrow the universe of companies to conduct further research on.

I put a lot of effort into writing my book and making an investment plan out of the best of what the world’s most successful investors have revealed, published and taught. And I am delighted that you have allowed me to share that with you. Thank you.

Where do I get the raw data Roger?

I have previously posted a document called ‘Source Data’, where Value.able graduates contributed their solutions to obtaining the data. Because I am receiving so many requests for help finding the data, I thought it useful to republish it. Click here or click the Value.able Source Data button to the right.

I was saddened to hear that one Value.able reader thought getting the data was all too hard and gave up. That’s like knowing there’s silver and gold a metre under your feet but saying that grabbing a shovel and digging is just too hard. If you don’t want to do the work that’s fine, but please don’t blame the guy who gave you the map, the pick and the shovel.

Using the information in my Source Data document, you should now be in a rock solid position to start estimating future intrinsic Value.able values.

Take a look at the Source Data document and you will see that the raw data is freely available. Indeed every single number you need to estimate the current intrinsic value is also available in a company’s annual report, and its all free at ASX.com.au.

With sources like Commsec and the formula I have given you for future equity, you can now freely estimate the forecast intrinsic value as well. Just go to ASX.com.au, click on the announcements link, select the company code and the year you need and voila! All the information is there in the annual report.

Value.able outlines the way I invest. I don’t have a green button that I press each day that automatically goes and buys the best opportunities. Value investing requires research and analysis. We can build devices that give us some short cuts, but they don’t replace the need to understand the business and the risks.

Why are my valuations different to Roger’s?

If everyone uses exactly the same inputs, our Value.able valuations will all be identical. Any differences therefore are due to different data. Some examples of sources of variation are:

• Online brokers’ ROE numbers are calculated differently to the way I suggest in Value.able. They use ending equity and I suggest average equity.
• Generic net profit after tax figures available on various online summary lists may or may not remove abnormal/significant or non-recurring items. Intrinsic values should be based on recurring profits, revenues and expenses. (Yes there is some subjectivity in this).
• I have noticed many of you using 10% discount rates for all companies. As I suggest in Value.able, this may be too low in some cases.

There are a variety of reasons and your Value.able valuations are different to mine.

Recently on TV I indicated that my valuation of Telstra was closer to $2.30-$2.50, but one Value.able graduate produced $3.68. I suspect that the difference is simply the choice of discount rate. Many investors will use a low discount rate because TLS such a big company with plenty of liquidity and very low risk of significant change. I however might use a higher rate because I want compensation for the fact that its future prospects are opaque and its profits haven’t grown a dollar in a decade.

Thinking about differing results, I am encouraged that many Value.able graduates were able to replicate my results exactly, or within a couple of cents.

Value.able will stand the test of time because it is based on a method of investing that works. It is a method of investing that requires time to demonstrate its value. And in time I look forward to hearing many more of your success stories.

Only a few First Edition hardback copies of Value.able remain. So if you haven’t purchased your reserved copy yet, now is not the time to ponder.

There was only one print run of the First Edition hardback. The paperback Second Edition will be available in mid November.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 1 October 2010.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Insightful Insights, Investing Education, Value.able.

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Pretty soon, the QR National prospectus will hit your mailboxes. Its the biggest float since Telstra’s 2006 offering and the second largest in Australia’s history, so the PR companies and the communication consultants will be out in force doing their job for the vendors. But who will represent the buyers? We will! Value.able Graduates, sharpen your pencils! If you have any thoughts to share right now, go ahead. We already have received a number of comments:

Lloyd says:

“Your summary of the pending QR National IPO at the start of Your Money Your Call and the parallel discussion in the Eureka Report are on target, with one exception, that of Business Leadership which is the dead elephant in the room that no one seems willing to discuss. So I’ll raise the topic here. Management at QR National are some of the same people that arguably ran BHP onto the rocks in 1998. The problem that led to the disaster was that of the arrogant culture of the “Big Australian”. The culture led to massive errors in capital allocation in a capital intensive industry with disastrous consequences for shareholders that continued for a long time. Fast forward to the QR National IPO advertising campaign. Notice the parallels in the advertising for the for the float with the “Big Australian” ethos of the nineties? And QR National is a very capital intensive business with massive structural and business cultural deficiencies that are the result of its existence to date as a Government owned sheltered workshop.  The leadership ethos appears to be such that the “planets are aligned” for shareholder value destruction on yet another grand scale. Regards, Lloyd”

Lloyd’s observation that some people who ran “the big Australian” during arguably, its dark days, are those involved now with the campaign to “be involved in something BIG” at QR National is well worth thinking about and speaking to your advisor about before subscribing.

At a dinner party on the weekend the subject of QR National came up and what is interesting is that the campaign is leveraging the well-known ‘China-needs-our-coal’ theme. But outside of the financial markets sentiment towards coal is not inspiring. Many retail investors believe coal is dirty, the cause of global warming and on its way out. CEO Lance Hockridge has previously rejected invitations to discuss climate change and as Paddy Manning of The Sydney Morning Herald noted on Saturday: “In 2007 a NASA climate scientist, James Hansen, likened coal trains to ”death trains – no less gruesome than if they were boxcars headed to crematoria, loaded with uncountable irreplaceable species’‘.

While diesel trains may be better for the environment than trucks, the 200 million tonnes of coal QR National carries per annum (2/3rds of the nations export volume) is not. Perhaps the retail component of the offering may not be as easy as previously expected. Paddy Manning again:

“Last week Professor Ross Garnaut, author of Australia’s 2008 Climate Change Review, told ABC Radio he thought world coal demand would peak before 2020 unless carbon capture and storage (CCS) – or some other use for massive carbon dioxide emissions – succeeds.

Garnaut is not pessimistic about CCS being commercially viable at scale in the right locations. But the Chinese want their demand for coal to peak before 2020, and while he admits that’s ”not a certainty”, Garnaut thinks there are ”reasonable prospects of China achieving objectives along these lines”.

”China over recent years and in the years immediately ahead represents a large majority of the global growth in coal use, and with other developed countries seeking to reduce total emissions absolutely by substantial amounts, such a change in trajectory in China would be likely to be associated with a peaking over the next decade in global coal use.”

Investors want a growth story. If the idea gets about that coal demand might peak within a decade, it could seriously weaken demand for QR shares.”

On the other hand, it is noted by many that Australian coal tends to produce lower emissions per unit of energy and steel production in the case of coking coal (our coal is a higher quality). With climate change on the agenda, demand for Australian coal could increase even when coal demand globally is falling.

The marketing machine has its work cut out but if hype can get even the biggest floats over the line, our job here will be to cut through it and answer a simple question.

Should you invest in QR National long term?

Lets get the conversation going with a couple of simple bullet points:

1. 1. Strongly supportive themes; privatisation, commodity demand, and a monopoly (monopolies are great businesses to own and QR National owns 2300kms of track on which it will deliver 160 million tonnes of coal annually)
2. 2. ABARE says coal volumes will rise more than 9% next year
3. 3. Chinese demand to peak before 2020
4. 4. Private interests have already tried to buy the below rail assets for $4.85 billion and the above rail assets for $2 billion
5. 5. 2011-2012 EBITDA forecast by float promoters of $1.1 billion (never ask the barber whether you need a haircut)
6. 6. EBITDA for a capital intensive business is NOT what the investor owns! The company will have plenty of interest to pay on $2 billion of debt then, lots of equipment to maintain and replace and a not shortage of tax
7. 7. Capital intensive business
8. 8. Low return on equity forecast for 2012 – after a two year turnaround program
9. 9. Moving from government ownership to private ownership should make the company more efficient
10. 10. Old contracts signed on uncommercial terms will roll off and new contracts will immediately boost revenue and profits (some newspapers suggest 22% increase in profits to $1.1 billion)
11. 11. Tens of thousands of job cuts have already been made – perhaps the low hanging ‘cost cutting’ fruit has already been picked?
12. 12. Chinese demand for coal will always be strong?
13. 13. Coal prices will always be high?
14. 14. Unions campaigning against the sale of state assets note that Telstra and Brisconnections were bad floats for investors

Brokers have estimated an enterprise value of between six and a half and nine and half billion dollars. I am not sure however what debt figures they have used (whether it is the $500 million QR National will start with or the $2 billion its expected to draw down in the next couple of years). Assuming $500 million, the promoters therefore may be reckoning on a market cap of around $7 billion. Of course never ask a barber whether you need a haircut!

QR National expects to boost pre-tax profits from $204 million to $427 million this financial year, and by 35 per cent to $578 million in 2011-12. But this could at least partly be attributable to a reduction in interest from the repayment of loans. In any case, investors own post tax profits which would reasonably be estimated to be about $390 million – a 5.5% return on contributed equity?

You should ignore the comparisons of P/E that will inevitably be seen. Comparing the P/E of QR National to, for example, Asciano, may be as useful as comparing the P/E of Myer to the P/E of David Jones at the time of the float – both fell precipitously after the money was in the vendor’s pockets.

Another thing to be careful of looking at are the stats available on other large Australian Commonwealth privatisations. Bank West, CSL, CBA, GIO, SGIO, Tabcorp and Unitab were all outstandingly successful examples, generating double digit returns annually for investors and Bank West GIO, SGIO, NSW TAB and Unitab were all taken over. But Qants and Telstra have been duds and the annual return from NSW TAB was not so crash hot, despite its takeover. The message is that yes, there are profts to be made from privatisations but only from those where economic value has been added.

The prospectus for QR National will invariably focus on growth – growth in revenues, growth in profits, improvements in efficiencies.

The price to pay however will be determined by the equity and the return that equity can generate. That is something we’ll focus on here.

For now we all await your thoughts. When the prospectus is released we’ll have a good look.

In the meantime, please contribute your thoughts, valuation estimates and any other insights you have.

If you are considering an investment in QR National, be sure to seek and take personal professional advice and you can come here for insights that will generate the questions to ask your adviser.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 27 September 2010.

UPDATE – The Sydney Morning Herald (Passengers sought for latest float) and The Sunday Age (Board QR National float with caution) have published my insights in the past week.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Investing Education.

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While everyone else seems to have moved on from reporting season, I’m still digging my way through a mountain of analysis. I am almost done.

Based on the amount of comments contributed here at my blog it seems you have enjoyed reading my insights as much as I have enjoyed sharing them.

Before I get into what I have uncovered from last week’s filings, congratulations are in order. Gavin was the first Value.able Graduate to correctly pick the three companies I omitted from Part III’s second table – congratulations Gavin. Gavin picked all three despite there being thousands of companies listed on the ASX and only having six pieces of financial data. Amazing!

Congratulations are also in order to Mike and Pat, who picked all three. Great digging fellow Value.able Graduates!

The missing companies are ARB Corporation (ARP), Wotif.com (WTF) and Mineral Resources (MIN).

As always, please undertake your own research and seek and take personal professional advice before you go rush out and buy anything.

I also wanted to say a big thank you to all who have posted comments. Our Value.able investing community has benefited greatly from your contributions and insights and I am excited by the great sense of community that you have developed. I must say a special thank you to our regular contributors – the quality of your comments are amazing, and more importantly, respectful and non-judgmental. Keep them coming!

If you haven’t yet posted a comment, now is a great time to start. The Value.able community is here to share ideas and help each other. If something is on your mind, I guarantee there is someone else with a similar question. So please contribute as much as you can or ask as many questions that you may have.

Now onto my lists – despite all my digging, there is only one new entrant into my A1 Montgomery Quality Rating this week. With three companies experiencing rating declines, on a net basis we actually lost two A1s. You can see them below.

Dominion Mining (DOM) had the largest rating decline, from an A1 to an A3. It still displays high quality metrics – with $16m in cash on the balance sheet and no debt (just watch out for those capitalised exploration expenditures), but my Montgomery Quality Rating declined. Why?

As you know, I tend to shy away from commodity businesses. It is not that they are difficult to understand, but rather difficult to forecast with a great deal of confidence – forecasting how much they will produce and when, their cost of production and/or project establishment and development costs and then ultimately, what price they will get for their production. There are simply too many variables that management can get wrong and many that are completely out of their control.

To this point I proffer Dominion (ASX: DOM), which in the most recent financial year, despite a higher average gold price, saw production slip from 98,755 ounces to 80,570 and cash production costs blow out from $438 to $697 per ounce. The combination of lower production and lower efficiencies transformed a highly profitable business into a barely profitable one in the space of 12 months. Now that’s operating leverage!

Indeed if you took all of the hitherto-labelled ‘resource evaluation and mine development expenditure’ expenses straight to the Profit and Loss account as opposed to the Balance Sheet, DOM would have made a loss of several million.

Given the many variables and accounting flexibility, if exposure to this sector is your goal, perhaps your focus could move from those who ‘look for’ and ‘produce’ to those who ‘service’ – the suppliers of the picks and shovels and those engineering businesses that install, maintain and replace all the picks and shovels. In my opinion, there are fewer variables and the economics haven’t changed since the days in 1851 when a gold rush in Ballarat saw 10,000,000 grams of gold delivered to Melbourne’s Treasury.

Back to my A1’s… the only entrant this week is Centrebet International (CIL). Remember that this is in addition to the 30 revealed so far in my previous posts – Part I, Part II and Part III. My A1’s now total 31.

CIL is in the business of online wagering and gaming and appears to have carved out a niche in Australia’s multi-billion dollar gambling market.

Take a look below and you will also see those companies that have achieved an A2 Montgomery Quality Rating since my previous blog post. The average ROE of this group is an impressive 23.39% (albeit around half that of my A1’s) with an average gearing level of -36.05%. There are plenty of Balance Sheets here reflecting a net cash position.

Combine my A1s and A2s (78 in total) published in the past couple of weeks and you have an excellent starting point from which to begin your own digging (by doing your own research and seeking independent personal and professional advice).

I will also mention that I may own any of the above companies and that I may buy or sell at any time – even tomorrow, and I am under no obligation to keep the list up to date in any way, shape or form. Before you do anything, YOU MUST conduct your own research and I insist you obtain independent personal and professional advice considering your needs and circumstances.

Value.able gives you the simple steps to follow to estimate a value for each company yourself and some thoughts to consider in regards to qualitative factors, such as competitive advantage. If you are not already a Value.able Graduate, why not?

Also remember that the share price may halve tomorrow. DO NOT buy shares in any company simply because I like it or own it – that is not investing, that is speculation. Speculating that I am right is not investing. That is the exact opposite of the value investing doctrine I espouse.

Reporting season will soon be a distant memory and the media, analysts and ‘investors’ will start to think about other things… the economies of the US, China and Europe will start to tickle the minds of idle analysts and commentators, but your focus should remain on great quality companies trading at very big discounts to intrinsic value.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 15 September 2010.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Insightful Insights, Investing Education.

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I met with Justine and Dickie, the CFO and COO of Decmil recently, and got a good understanding of how cash flows through the business.

I am comfortable that the disastrous acquisition track record of the past is now just that; past. The board now appears stable, culture within the business appears to be excellent and if Justine and Dickie’s enthusiasm is anything to go by, their reputation, which has taken 31 years to build, will see them continue to secure projects from blue chip clients (don’t ask me what ‘blue chip’ means).

There are of course macro risks in supplying picks and shovels. The GFC for example didn’t dent BHP and RIO’s aspirations, but it did dent the banks’ willingness to lend on new projects. A macro shock could thwart the capex plans of many resource companies and this would inevitably impact Decmil and its peers. Operating leverage however is not as high as you may think and I invite you to investigate.

So go forth and conduct your own research and as always, seek professional financial advice. You can also use the steps in Value.able to calculate the value of Decmil yourself.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 14 September 2010.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Energy / Resources.

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That’s what Peter Switzer asked me on Wednesday night on the Sky Business Channel. My response? I focus on A1 businesses that I need to focus on the least (just twice a year when half and full year results are released). As for the stocks… you’ll have to watch the interview.

Switzer TV with Peter Switzer was broadcast on 8 September 2010 on the Sky Business Channel.

 Click here to watch other interviews at my YouTube Channel.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 10 September 2010

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Investing Education.

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More than 900 companies reported their results over the past 3 weeks and having reviewed the bulk of them, some still remain. I should have completed digging through the reporting season avalanche within the next week or two. You will have to bear with me for a little while longer.

Rest assured that the companies that are amazing and who deserve a place in the ‘investment universe’ have been prioritised and covered first. While some of the businesses left to cover may make it in, overall I expect that I have broken the back of reporting season and already uncovered in the main those worth focusing on.

So since my last update you may be wondering what has transpired.

Firstly, Information Technology and Mining/Oil & Gas Services sectors have continued to stand out, with a number of additional companies receiving high MQRs (“Montgomery Quality Ratings”). To this we can add businesses that I generally classify as ‘financial services’, for example funds management.

Secondly, there are a number of new entrants into my A1 list this week – 19 in total. This is in addition to the 11 uncovered in my previous posts – Part I and Part II. My A1’s now total 30.

To get to the magic number of 19 for this week there are 15 outright new inclusions, four that continued to hold the rating from last year and eight businesses that experienced a MQR decline. That’s a net increase of 11 businesses with MQRs of A1.

Of the eight businesses that received lower MQRs, all due to specific business issues, Servcorp (SRV) Limited saw the largest decline, followed closely by Worley Parsons (WOR) and Southern Cross Electrical (SXE).

Worley Parsons experienced a number of project delays and deferrals. In particular, services in the Canadian oil sands and minerals & metals sectors, coupled with a material downturn in the United States power markets appear to be the main issues. Also, with a large segment of the business’s operations being conducted in foreign currencies, the continued strength of the Australian Dollar impacted the translation of profits to the tune of $41 million. All these factors had a significant impact on profitability and performance. While Worley remains a very high quality company, the business’s performance slipped.

Southern Cross Electrical was also impacted by delays and project deferrals. In this case the uncertainty around the proposed Resources Super Profit Tax (RSPT) and operational issues following the resignation of the Managing Director appears to have impacted on the frequency of tendering activity and subsequently, the awarding of new projects. All of this – because of the operating leverage inherent in the business – reduced SXE’s margins and profitability.

Servcorp experienced the largest performance decline, falling from 1 to 4 (5 is the lowest). This was mostly due to the $80 million capital raising in October last year, in order to aggressively expand the business. Only time will tell if new management are able to get the business back to its former A1 status.  New, wiz-bang ads alone won’t do it, although they may help.

Now don’t go panicking about these companies or their downgraded status. It’s not as though they are C5s!  A2 and A3 can be regarded as investment grade (with a smaller allocation), although I would adopt a wait-and-see policy with an A4.

The second table reveals the 19 additional A1s.

If you look to the bottom right of this table you can see the average ROE reported by my A1 list of businesses is an impressive 40.40% – significantly higher than the All Ords average ROE of 9.54%.

Also impressive is the average gearing level of my A1’s at -36.25%. The negative number means that many of the businesses are debt free and have plenty of cash. If you read my McMillan Shakespeare post, you should now see why I avoid businesses that are geared; there is a ready supply of other quality players to look at that aren’t laden with debt.

At this point you may have already noticed that I have blacked out 3 of the 19 A1’s for this week. There is a good reason for that. I am currently researching a number of businesses to see if an investment opportunity is available at current prices.

I will reveal them at a later date along with whether or not I have decided to buy the shares. I have however left you with some important information – their respective ROE and net-debt to equity levels. Note they all have impressive returns on equity and net cash. If you dig hard enough, you may be able to find them before I reveal them.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 7 September 2010.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Investing Education.

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The final reporting season avalanche has coincided with a serious amount of snow in the high plains. No matter where one turns, there’s no escaping heavy falls. More than 300 companies have reported in five days and I am completely snowed under. If you haven’t yet received my reply to your email, now you understand why.

To put my week into perspective, up until last Monday morning, around 200 companies had reported (see my Part I and Part II reporting season posts). This week’s 300-company avalanche brought the total to 500. I’m sorry to report that without a snowplough, I have fallen behind somewhat. Around 200 are left in my in-tray to dig through. I will get to them!

Thankfully, there are only a few days left in the window provided by ASX listing Rule 4.3B in which companies with a June 30 balance date must report, and by this afternoon, I will be able to appreciate the backlog I have to work through. So not long to go now…

Nonetheless, today I would like to talk about two companies which I am sure many of you are interested in: BHP and Woolworths. Both received the ‘Montgomery’ B1 quality score this year.

For the full year, BHP reported a net profit of around A$14b and a 27% ROE – a big jump on last years $7b result, which was impacted by material write-offs. Backing out the write-offs, last years A$16b profit and ROE of 36% was a better result than this years. The fall in the business’s profitability has likewise seen my 2010 valuation fall from $34-$38 to around $26-$30 per share, or a total value of $145b to $167b (5.57 billion shares on issue).

With the shares trading in a range of $35.58 to $44.93 ($198b to $250b) for the entire 52 weeks, it appears that the market and analysts expected much better things. While they didn’t come this year, are they just around the corner? I will let you be the judge.

The “market” (don’t ask who THAT is!) estimates resource company per share earnings growth of 50 per cent for 2011. I have drawn a thick blue line to show this on the left hand side of the following graph so you can see where my line intersects.

BHP has a large weighting in the resources sector, so the forecast increase in net earnings by 57 per cent to A$22b is having a material impact on the sector average. Importantly, the forecast growth rate is similar to those seen in 2005 and 2006 when the global economy was partying like there was no GFC. Call me conservative, but I reckon those estimates are a little optimistic in todays environment.

As you know I leave the forecasting of the economy and arguably puerile understandings of cause-and-effect relationships to those whose ability is far exceeded by their hubris. Its worth instead thinking about what BHP has itself stated; “BHP Billiton remains cautious on the short-term outlook for the global economy”.

Given my conservative nature when it comes to resource companies and the numerous unknowns you have to factor in, I would be inclined to be more conservative with my assumptions when undertaking valuations for resource companies. If you take on blind faith a A$22b profit, BHP’s shares are worth AUD $45-$50 each.

But before you take this number as a given, note the red circle in the above chart. Earnings per share growth rates are already in the process of being revised down. I would expect further revisions to come. And if my ‘friends-in-high-places’ are right, it’s not out of the realm of possibilities to see iron ore prices fall 50 per cent in short order. You be the judge as to how conservative you make your assumptions.

A far simpler business to analyse is Woolworths and for a detailed analysis see my ValueLine column in tonight’s Eureka Report. WOW reported another great result with a return on shareholders’ funds of 28% (NPAT of just over $2.0b) only slightly down from 29% ($1.8b) last year. This was achieved on an additional $760m in shareholders’ funds or a return on incremental capital of 26% – and that’s just the first years use of those funds. This is an amazing business given its size.

My intrinsic value rose six per cent from $23.71 in 2009 to $25.07 in 2010. Add the dividend per share of $1.15 and shareholders experienced a respectable total return.

Without the benefit of the $700 million buyback earnings are forecast by the company to rise 8-11 per cent. However, the buyback will increase earnings per share and return on equity, but decrease equity. The net effect is a solid rise in intrinsic value. Instead of circa $26 for 2011, the intrinsic value rises to more than $28.

But it’s not the price of the buyback that I will focus on as that will have no effect on the return on equity and a smaller-than-you-think effect on intrinsic value (thanks to the fact that only around 26 million shares will be repurchased and cancelled). What I am interested in is how the buyback will be funded. You see WOW now need to find an additional $700m to undertake this capital management initiative. So where will the proceeds come from? That sort of money isn’t just lying around. The cash flow statement is our friend here.

In 2010 Operating Cash Flow was $2,759.9 of which $1,817.7m was spent on/invested in capital expenditure, resulting in around $900m or 45% of reported profits being free cash flow – a similar level to last year. A pretty impressive number in size, but a number that also highlights how capital intensive owning and running a supermarket chain can be.

From this $900m in surplus cash, management are free to go out and reinvest into other activities including acquisitions, paying dividends, buybacks and the like. So if dividends are maintained at $1.1-$1.2b (net after taking into account the DRP), that means the business does not have enough internally generated funds to undertake the buyback. They are already about $200-$300m short with their current activities. In 2010 WOW had to borrow $500m to make acquisitions, pay dividends and fund the current buyback.

Source: WOW 2010 Annual Report

Clearly the buyback cannot be funded internally, so external sources of capital will be required. In the case of the recently announced buyback it appears the entire $700m buyback will need to be financed via long-term debt issued into both domestic and international debt capital markets, which management have stated will occur in the coming months. They also have a bank balance of $713m, but this has not been earmarked for this purpose.

Currently WOW has a net debt-equity ratio of 37.4 per cent so assuming the buyback is fully funded with external debt, the 2011 full year might see total net gearing rise to $4.250b on equity of $8,170b = 52 per cent.

A debt-funded buyback will be even more positive for intrinsic value than I have already stated, but of course the risk is increased.

While 52 per cent is not an exuberant level of financial leverage given the quality of the business’s cash flows, I do wonder why Mr Luscombe and Co don’t suspend the dividend to fund the buyback rather than leverage up the company with more debt? This is particularly true if they believe the market is underpricing their shares.

Yes, it’s a radical departure from standard form.

What do you think?

I will leave you with that question and I will be back later in the week with a new list of A1 and A2 businesses. Look out for Part Three.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 31 August 2010.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Consumer discretionary, Energy / Resources.

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It is not unusual for me to seem contrarian in my thoughts about stocks. And it is often the case that I am fond of companies out of favour at least temporarily. As prices rise I become less enthused rather than more so. Quite simply, the higher the price, the lower the return.

The last time I commented about McMillan Shakespeare was 27 May this year (MMS: $2.64). It was then that I stated that if that nothing came out of the Ken Henry Tax Review that permanently impacted MMS’ profitability, the shares were worth $6.01 – you can find me making those comments here.

With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the legislative concerns surrounding the business failed to eventuate (well not yet – they await the next Government), and the shares have traded as high as $6.45 since.

But since MMS has released its annual results, you may be wondering if and how my thoughts have changed since May. Please keep in mind, as I have said many times before, I am under no obligation to continue analysing a business or updating my comments.

If you watch the interview above, clearly I was happy with the quality of MMS and its valuation being materially above its price. Indeed it was one of my A1’s at the time – so let me fill in the gaps.

As you would be well aware from Value.able, you should not focus on the share price but on the business itself. It’s a simple truth that if the underlying business does well then the share price tends to look after itself. While I am impressed about the price currently trading close to my valuation, am I still happy with MMS as an investment candidate? In short, no.

Things can change pretty quickly in business. One minute you are staring down the barrel of a major financial review with the threat of having half of your business taken away over night, and the next you are on the front foot and announcing a major acquisition. It’s the latter than concerns me.

Three days after my TV interview, MMS management announced the acquisition of Interleasing (Australia) Limited (ILA) in a 34 page information memorandum and 9 days later completed the purchase.

In that IM was a detailed breakdown of the purchase. I had suspected for a long time that management where keenly looking for an acquisition given it was producing so much free cash flow.

Up until this point, MMS had been an A1 every year since 2006. Given my stringent A1 rules, to achieve this rating four years in a row is an excellent achievement by founder Anthony Podesta. But with new management come new ideas, and this time the idea was to take a debt free business and fund the ILA acquisition with $25m of existing cash, $41.3m from the sale of ILA’s novated lease receivables and debt totalling $141.7m. A total purchase price (not value) of $208m.

The impact can be seen on the business’s balance sheet;

Source: MMS 2010 Annual Report

If you tally the circles labelled “1” you will discover that the business now has net debt (total debt less cash and bank balances) of $125.156m. If you then look at the final line of the balance sheet “equity” which stands at $89,417 we can calculate that MMS (which was completely debt free last year) now has a gearing level of 139.97%. This in anyone’s book is a high level of gearing and a material change on the conservative financials in prior years.

If we now look at the circles labelled ‘2”, you will note that the business’s current liabilities (items which generally require repayment within the next 12 months) exceed by more than double the level of current assets (the liquid assets available to meet obligations due within the next 12 months).

In analyst speak; a current ratio of just 0.4972 is generally poor. In contrast the ratio last year was a healthy 1.9694.

While the uplift in earnings per share has been a boon for shareholders, as you can see, there has been a huge price to pay. In summary, the quality of the business has fallen from what I considered to be an A1 business to a B3.

Many will argue that MMS generates huge cashflows and that it still produces excellent (albeit highly geared) returns on equity and it should therefore have no concerns in meeting its interest expenses and maintaining its current capital structure for the foreseeable future. While this is all true, I always prefer to reduce risk in my portfolio by owning extraordinary businesses.

My investment process prevents me from investing in anything but the highest quality companies; one of the characteristics that I look for is little or no debt.

Also, when management start saying “key requirements of this funding” are that our “dividend payout ratio not to exceed 65%”, “interest and debt cover covenants” I have to wonder; are management controlling the business or is the bank?

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 26 August 2010.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies.

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The second full week of reporting season has just been and gone and saw another 80-100 companies report their financial results. More than 200 have reported and yes I am working feverishly to keep up and cover them all. I am happy to report that I’m ready for another week.

So far the results have been mixed. Information Technology, Banking and Mining/Oil & Gas Services sectors have stood-out, receiving high Montgomery Quality Ratings. The remainder have been distributed somewhat randomly amongst the other sectors.

And having analysed all of them so far, I can reveal that only 11 (5.5%) of the 200 have achieved my coveted A1 status (an additional six on top of the five from my previous post). These businesses have all passed my rigorous stress tests and come up trumps.

You may be surprised that after another full week and 80-100 individual results, only six additional companies have made it. But my A1 rating system has been specifically formulated to yield only the best and it is performing its function very well.

Of the six companies, three held onto their A1 status. These are Carsales.com.au (CRZ), Forge Group (FGE) and Monadelphous (MND) which have been joined by 3 new entrants in DWS Advanced Business Solutions (DWS), Finbar Group Limited (FRI) and SMS Management and technology (SMX).

Unfortunately, on a net basis we lost one A1 this year with four other businesses experiencing ratings declines from A1. These businesses include CSL limited (CSL), Consolidated Media Holdings (CMJ), Integrated Research (IRI) and McMillan Shakespeare (MMS). While CSL and CMJ have both declined to A2 status – nothing to be sneezed at, IRI and MMS have had larger rating declines.

Most notably, MMS has declined materially in terms of quality as I predicted it might after its acquisition, and it is now a ‘B3’. The mostly debt-funded acquisition of Interleasing (Australia) is the cause of this fall which I will cover in a separate post.

There are also another 20 A2 businesses that have passed my stress tests and rate in the top 15 per cent of the market in terms of overall quality.

Don’t forget to combine these lists with the A1 and A2 businesses I highlighted last week to continue identifying the best of the rest and stay tuned, I will post my intrinsic valuations for all 11 A1 businesses soon.

Finally, an update on my Telstra valuation. Last week I said that my valuation following the annual result was $2.50. I have updated my numbers and now get $2.30.

I sincerely hope that my Telstra comments have served your research well and that you have not been caught by all of the “it’s high yield and therefore a cheap stock” talk.

While others may have been tempted to buy shares for ‘yield’, you can use Value.able to first discover the intrinsic value. To save you a little time, Telstra’s valuation has declined since it listed. Even in the past year intrinsic value has fallen from $3.00 to $2.30! And the share price has fallen from $3.55 to the current $2.77.

In reality this is a widely reported and closely tracked company and its weighting in the index ensures a level of support from the large, conventional, index-based and tracking-error-focused funds. Indeed this is one of the reasons it has taken so long for Benjamin Graham’s weighing machine to catch up to the valuation – ten years! An improvement in the clarity for Telstra (forgetting whether its profitable for the business) could be enough to result in substantial price rises. Of course as a disciplined value investor focused on only the highest quality business, I cannot let that speculation tempt me.

Read Part I.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, 24 August 2010.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Investing Education, Value.able.

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