When a company buys back its shares, the announcement is often accompanied by reports suggesting either 1) the company has no other growth options towards which it can employ equity capital or, 2) the company has great confidence in its future and other shareholders should be following its lead rather than selling out to the company itself.
Back in 1984, in his Chairman’s Letter to Shareholders (a source of information I have quoted frequently here and in Value.able), Warren Buffett observed:
“When companies with outstanding businesses and comfortable financial positions find their shares selling far below intrinsic value in the marketplace, no alternative action can benefit shareholders as surely as repurchases.”
Note to CFOs and CEOs: “shares selling far below intrinsic value in the marketplace.”
It is just as important for the CEO of a public company to be buying shares only when they are below intrinsic value, as it is for Value.able Graduates building a portfolio.
Buying shares above intrinsic value will destroy value as surely as buying high and selling low – something many Australian companies became all to expert at during the GFC as they issued shares in their millions at prices not only below intrinsic value, but below equity per share.
One question to ask is if companies are engaging in buy backs today, why weren’t they when their shares were much, much lower? The answer of course may be that they may not have had the capital back then. A recovery from the lows of the GFC has not only occurred in the prices of shares trading in the market place, but also in the cash-generating performance of the underlying businesses themselves.
Irrespective of the circumstances, a company now buying back shares that had previously issued them at the depths of the GFC is having a second crack at wealth destruction.
I am pleased to report that not all companies are following the crowd. Some larger companies, including BHP, RIO and Woolworths, have announced buy backs at or slightly below my estimate of their Value.able intrinsic values.
Webjet, Customers, Coventry Group and Charter Hall Retail REIT have all announced buy backs and Bendigo/Adelaide Bank is engaging in one to reverse the impact of shares issued through their DRP.
As I wrote yesterday (Is there any value around?), value is becoming much harder to find. Companies are expensive, even my A1s. Whilst any Value.able valuation is merely an estimate, the absence of a large Margin of Safety, combined with the announcements of buy backs, does not inspire my confidence.
In the US, share buy backs historically peak at market highs. Think back to the first half of 2007 and in 1999 and 2000 – two periods that investors may have wished they’d sold shares back to the companies – are also periods during which buy backs peaked.
Share buy backs are a very public demonstration of management’s capital allocation ability, or lack thereof.
Whilst Warren Buffett is regarded as the master of share buy backs, he has often sited another capital allocator as the real genius – the late Dr. Henry Singleton, the founder and CEO of Teledyne.
When the inflation-devastated stock market of the 1970s had pushed shares to the point that some suggested ‘equities were dead’, Henry Singleton bought back so many shares that by the mid 1980s there were 90% less Teledyne shares on issue. Here’s a para from the web: “In 1976, the company attempted, for the sixth time since 1972, to buy back its stock in order to eliminate the possibility of a takeover attempt by someone eager for the cash reserves the company had accumulated. Altogether, Teledyne spent $450 million buying back its stock, leaving $12 million outstanding, compared to $37.4 million at the close of 1972. With many of the company’s divisions showing stronger results and fewer shares outstanding, Teledyne’s stock increased from a low of $9.50 per share to $45 per share, becoming the largest gainer on the New York Stock Exchange.”
Who is Teledyne’s Australian equivalent?
One iconic Aussie business (it achieves my second highest MQR – A2) immediately springs to mind. In 2009 this business issued shares at a high price to fund a $A3.5 billion acquisition. But things didn’t quite go to plan… the US Federal Trade Commission intervened and the shares slumped. What did management do? They used the cash raised from the share issue to buy them back. Amazing!
Fast-forward twelve months and this business has nearly $1 billion in cash in the bank and no debt. If it keeps using its own cash and that being generated, and buying back shares at the present rate (and assuming the share price doesn’t change of course), it will have bought back all its shares in seven years. A Value.able business… what do you think?
Yes, if not for management’s decision to buy back shares ABOVE intrinsic value.
Unfortunately CSL’s share price may not be as high in seven years as it could have been, had management chosen to buy back its shares below intrinsic value.
If you own shares in a company engaging in a buy back, ask yourself whether value is being added to the company? Value is generated when the shares being purchased are available at prices below your estimate of its Value.able intrinsic value.
If management are overpaying, inappropriate capital allocation practices may be the only addition to the future prospects of the business.
Posted by Roger Montgomery, author and fund manager, 1 March 2011.