Roger Montgomery is the Founder and Chairman of Montgomery Investment Management. Roger has over three decades of experience in funds management and related activities, including equities analysis, equity and derivatives strategy, trading and stockbroking. Prior to establishing Montgomery, Roger held positions at Ord Minnett Jardine Fleming, BT (Australia) Limited and Merrill Lynch.
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This is a retail business that I’ve known for a long time, indeed in a past life I influenced one of its largest shareholdings.
At that time the company was leveraging its 90% brand awareness; increasing its return on equity every year, from 40% to ultimately more than 70%, without any debt; it was rolling out stores; it appeared to have perfected its buying strategy; and the share price had risen from $2.40 to a high of $18.60.
More than a year since I wrote that The Reject Shop shares were among the most expensive retail stocks and they touched their high, the performance has been somewhat unsurprising: declining to a closing low of $9 recently – a fall of just over 50%.
For those of you who have been fortunate enough to have been following us since 2009, you may recall in September 2009 when I wrote about the reasons why I decided to sell The Reject Shop:
“I can’t stop thinking that the value of the business just cannot rise at a fast enough clip to justify the current price. I really don’t like trading things that I have bought but I don’t think the value of the business can continue to rise indefinitely. With a share price of $13.45 (intraday today) and a valuation of $11.27, the shares are 24% above their intrinsic value. This combination of factors tells me we are safer in cash.”
Today the shares trade at about my current estimate for intrinsic value (see graph) of $9.22 and in anticipation of a possible big discount being presented, it’s worth reviewing our stance to determine whether we need to change it for this company.
Since I last wrote about the Reject Shop, a number of events have served to deliver sufficient concerns to market participants – analysts as well as investors – that they have turned their back on this once market darling.
First, the Queensland floods closed the Queensland distribution centre, seriously denting any supply chain efficiencies the company had built. Second, the company has doubled its equity base since 2006, from $26.6 million to $53 million, and this has been entirely due to the retention of earnings rather than less-desirable capital raisings. In the absence of an equivalent increase in profits, return on equity would be expected to decline. One way to stave off a decline in the all-important return on equity measure of performance is to increase leverage. The problem for the Reject Shop’s intrinsic value is that leverage has indeed increased – 34-fold – and yet return on equity next year is forecast to be lower next year than in 2006.
The Reject Shop still enjoys its high brand awareness but, as is typical in many store roll out stories, as the offer matures the later sites are less profitable than the early sites.
This doesn’t fully explain the fact that during a period in the economy where one would expect a bargain offering to shine, it hasn’t. Eighty percent of Australians still know the brand but I believe consumer experience and mismanagement has done it some damage.
According to one report, 20% of the population believe the company offers rubbish – cheap Chinese junk that quickly breaks after use and fills our tips. It’s the very reputation China itself is trying, but frequently failing, to shake off.
The other reason for damage to the brand is confusion brought on by mismanagement. Several years ago the average unit price was about $9 and basket size was $11, but over the years one cannot help but have noticed many higher-priced items creeping into the stores.
The Reject Shop was originally the place you went to for discounted seconds and end-of-line items. Under lauded retailer and merchant Barry Saunders, The Reject Shop successfully transitioned to a discount variety retailer, offering everyday lines at cheaper prices than the incumbents. Grey market (“parallel import”) Colgate toothpaste for $2 a tube and toilet paper for a few cents a roll ensured repeat business, higher inventory turnover and higher margins from consumers filling their baskets with other higher-margin items.
The company had successfully implemented the Walmart and Woolworths profit loop. Adding more expensive items, some in the $30, $40 and $50 bracket, confuses the offer and damages the brand. Simultaneously, inventory turnover falls and working capital costs increase.
Higher-priced items should at least partly explain why the company has not been performing well in the two-speed economy (I prefer to call it the one-cylinder economy) that would normally lend itself to the “bargain” offer. The other reason for the declining performance, including declining same-store sales growth, is the enthusiastic emergence of competitors. It’s really a second wave: The Reject Shop had put an end to Millers and the Warehouse Group previously. But now BIG W, Kmart, Target, Bunnings, a reinvigorated Mitre 10 and Masters will compete directly with The Reject Shop; you may have already seen some of their aggressive Christmas advertising.
If The Reject Shop’s offering had not been confused by the inclusion of higher-priced items, the company would have been in a much better position to defend its turf. The misguided product mix, however, appears to have left the gate open and the well-funded competitors have rushed in, as have Crazy Clarke’s, Sams Warehouse, Chicken Feed, GO-LO and more than 35 others. Of course these competitors will also compete for sites, potentially relegating The Reject Shop to less preferred sites or having to pay more for the best of the remaining locations.
That, and the possibility of a fall in the Australian dollar, represents the bad news. The good news is that The Reject Shop still has terrific brand awareness, many more stores to open, a reinvigorated marketing campaign and the reopening of the Queensland Distribution Centre ahead of the Christmas peak selling period.
On balance, if the company can hit its targets it could increase its intrinsic value by more than 15% per annum over the next three years and many believe the bad news and bearish case is factored into the share price. But I would like to see a decline in debt or a greater margin of safety or both, before buying its shares.
Rest assured that a rising tide (a rally in the stock market) will lift the price of the company’s shares. To be certain of a good return rather than be hopeful of an excellent one, we simply need a bigger discount, as the graph illustrates.
Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 3 December 2011.
Roger Montgomery discusses why Embelton (EMB) is one of his stocks to watch in 2012 in this article published in the December 2011 issue of Money Magazine. Read here.
In 1979, just like today, many thought equities were finished. Investors in Credit Corp, Flight Centre, Northern Star and many more top stocks would disagree. Read Roger’s article at www.eurekareport.com.au.
A good friend who lives and works in the UK recently sent me an allegory that succinctly describes, for those who haven’t read Michael Lewis, the growth of sub-prime loans, the collateralised debt obligations into which they were securitised and the credit default swaps which were the tradable insurance contracts on the CDO’s. It then goes on to neatly leave us with the consequences.
If you have seen it before or believe you have a solid understanding of the events, you are many steps ahead of most. For the rest of us,
Heidi provides an explanation;
Heidi is the proprietor of a bar … She realises that virtually all of her customers are unemployed alcoholics and, as such, can no longer afford to patronise her bar. To solve this problem, she comes up with a new marketing plan that allows her customers to drink now, but pay later.
Heidi keeps track of the drinks consumed on a ledger (thereby granting the customers loans). Word gets around about Heidi’s “drink now, pay later” marketing strategy and, as a result, increasing numbers of customers flood into Heidi’s bar. Soon she has the largest sales volume for any bar in Manchester…
By providing her customers freedom from immediate payment demands, Heidi gets no resistance when, at regular intervals, she substantially increases her prices for wine and beer, the most consumed beverages. Consequently, Heidi’s gross sales volume increases massively.
A young and dynamic manager at the local bank recognizes that these customer debts constitute valuable future assets and increases Heidi’s borrowing limit. He sees no reason for any undue concern because he has the debts of the unemployed alcoholics as collateral!
At the bank’s corporate headquarters, expert traders figure a way to make huge commissions, and transform these customer loans into DRINKBONDS. These “securities” then are bundled and traded on international securities markets.
Naive investors don’t really understand that the securities being sold to them as ‘AAA Secured Bonds’ really are debts of unemployed alcoholics. Nevertheless, the bond prices continuously climb – and the securities soon become the hottest-selling items for some of the nation’s leading brokerage houses.
One day, even though the bond prices still are climbing, a risk manager at the original local bank decides that the time has come to demand payment on the debts incurred by the drinkers at Heidi’s bar. He so informs Heidi. Heidi then demands payment from her alcoholic patrons. But, being unemployed alcoholics they cannot pay back their drinking debts. Since Heidi cannot fulfil her loan obligations she is forced into bankruptcy. The bar closes and Heidi’s 11 employees lose their jobs.
Overnight, DRINKBOND prices drop by 90%. The collapsed bond asset value destroys the bank’s liquidity and prevents it from issuing new loans, thus freezing credit and economic activity in the community. The suppliers of Heidi’s bar had granted her generous payment extensions and had invested their firms’ pension funds in the BOND securities. They find they are now faced with having to write off her bad debt and with losing over 90% of the presumed value of the bonds. Her wine supplier also claims bankruptcy, closing the doors on a family business that had endured for three generations, her beer supplier is taken over by a competitor, who immediately closes the local plant and lays off 150 workers.
Fortunately though, the bank, the brokerage houses and their respective executives are saved and bailed out by a multibillion dollar no-strings attached cash infusion from the government. The funds required for this bailout are obtained by new taxes levied on employed, middle-class, non-drinkers who have never been in Heidi’s bar.
Its nicely articulated don’t you think? Fortunately the problem is contained to…Earth. But where too next?
Postscript: This week, China’s vice-premier and head of finance, Wang Qishan, predicted that the global economy has commenced a long-term recession. He observed: “Now the global economic situation is extremely serious and in such a time of uncertainty the only thing we can be sure of is that the world economic recession caused by the international crisis will last a long time.”
Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 25 November 2011.
The Reject Shop is cheap but not good value. Read Roger’s article at www.eurekareport.com.au.
Roger Montgomery speaks to Ross Greenwood about his thoughts on Bluescope Steel. Listen
When Sean Connery played James Bond in the 1967 hit, You Only Live Twice one doubts he had this week’s billion dollar covered bond issue of ANZ in mind. Asking the question “what is a covered bond?” reveals an extra life has been given to borrowers at the expense of prudent savers. Its Australia’s own little moral hazard.
moral hazard n.- a situation in which a party insulated from risk behaves differently from how it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk.
According to the Treasurer, Wayne Swan, legislation the government passed last month will strengthen the local financial system, increase the supply of credit, and provide cheaper, more stable and longer-term funding.
ANZ this week issued $US1.25 billion of five-year covered bonds. CBA is looking to Europe for its issue while Westpac and NAB are said to be eyeing the US debt markets for theirs ahead of increases in wholesale funding costs on their upcoming refinancing.
When banks issue covered bond they pay a lower rate on their funding than if they issued senior unsecured debt. And if as some commentators suggest the banks in aggregate issue $100 billion of this stuff in coming years the savings can amount to more than half a billion in interest expenses.
The lower rate that banks enjoy on covered bonds is partly due to the AAA rating they receive. This AAA rating (which is higher than the AA rating the banks themselves enjoy) is derived from the fact that banks can use their assets (loans presumably) as collateral for issuing the bonds. If the bank goes bust, the bond holder as recourse to those assets.
Interestingly (and here’s why they just might be Triple A), if the assets are worthless the bondholder has recourse to the bank itself. In other words those bond holders get access to your deposit money and those bond holders rank BEFORE you in terms of their right to your money.
Unsurprisingly, the size of the covered bond market is therefore capped. Banks can only issue covered bonds backed by up to 8 per cent of their assets. Based on the majors’ full year results, the ANZ, CBA, WBC and NAB have a collective $2.686 trillion in assets. Eight percent of those assets amounts to $214.9 billion.
Many believe that the issues in Europe are contained to Europe. Someone wriley observed recently however that debt crises are only contained to planet earth. Investors like central banks who are limited to investing in AAA rated securities will no doubt be interested in the paper because our banks are perceived as safe. But what is that assumption based on? We’ll leave that discussion for your comments below.
What I am most interested in is the unilateral decision to allow that which has previously not been permitted; To rank a bond holder ahead of you in terms of rights to your deposits.
On the flip side, the banks argue that the cheaper funding means you can borrow from them more cheaply – assuming they pass it on of course. But like the ladies in James Bond’s bath, its all part of the policy drive in this country to make things cheap. Cheaper cars at the expense of local manufacturing, cheaper flights at the expense of local jobs, cheaper food at the expense of local farmers and cheaper bonds at the expense of your entitlement to your deposit.
Keep prices down and there won’t be an uprising. Have a good weekend.
Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 18 November 2011.
On Wednesday November 2 Woolworths held a strategy briefing for professional investors. Woolworth’s effectively asked us to adopt a longer time frame before judging its performance and revealed four strategic priorities that I will describe in a moment.
Prior to the strategy day, the company updated the stock market with a growth outlook that was the lowest in a decade. The market responded negatively to the change and it entrenched previous sentiment by professional investors to switch from Woolworths to Coles.
But Woolworths remains a superior business from a business economics perspective, with high return on equity and it also remains cheaper than its competitor as measured by the larger discount to an estimate of its intrinsic value.
The wider sentiment towards Woolworths Supermarkets is that the period of strong growth is over, and the other businesses, such as Big W, the New Zealand supermarkets, the Masters hardware venture and a possible acquisition of The Warehouse group could be the focus of earnings growth for the company. Gambling pre-committments would not be.
Meanwhile, the Woolworths-owned Dick Smith electronics business appears to have failed to excite consumers and has certainly failed to excite investment professionals. Dick Smith is a relatively weak offering in a market that has been hit particularly hard by the empowerment of the consumer through high Australian dollar.
Moreover, in many ways these businesses are peripheral since the Australian Food & Liquor division accounts for 80% of earnings before interest and tax.
The impact of the company’s lower growth profile on intrinsic value, particularly intrinsic values over the next two years, has been negative and intrinsic value does not appear to be going anywhere in a great hurry (see Skaffold chart below).
This combination of circumstances, in my experience, set Woolworths shares up to be vulnerable to any negative shocks.
Estimating intrinsic value is not the same as predicting price direction, however the above circumstances are not unique historically in putting a lead on price appreciation.
On top of the above combination of factors, there is also the continuing debate in Parliament about the introduction of preset loss limits for poker machines, which, if introduced, would negatively impact Woolworths’ gaming business. Though it is most closely associated with supermarkets, Woolworths is actually the largest poker machine owner in the country, with more than 10,700 pokies.
And a few weeks ago, The Economic Times of India also reported that Woolworths appears to have been dumped by its Indian partner, Tata Group. Woolworths enjoyed a five-year partnership with Tata, introducing Dick Smith-style electronics stores to India under the Infiniti Retail brand. Even though foreign retailers are not permitted to have a direct presence in India, Woolworths partnership offered the hope of growth – albeit with a partner – if the rules were ever relaxed.
Nonetheless, despite these accumulative negative factors, Woolworths is regarded by conventional analysts and investors as a defensive’ company. Its strong cash flows and its status as a major retailer of food makes it an ideal investment in a recessionary or slow or low growth environment. The company also enjoys entrenched competitive advantages over smaller rivals that, until now, the ACCC has done little about. One example of this are the new EFTPOS charges.
From the first of this month, the new Eftpos Payments Australia Limited (EPAL) fees mean retailers incur a 5¢ fee for every transaction over $15 (75% of all EFTPOS transactions). Previously there was no fee and that will still be the case for transactions under $15, which means 25% of transactions.
The retailer’s bank will charge the retailers, some of whom are describing the charges as an “EFTPOS tax”, and they will have no choice but to pass on to the consumer.
Unsurprisingly, EPAL’s members include the major banks, Coles and Woolworths and, because they manage their own terminals, they can opt out of the new charges.
But despite these entrenched advantages, Woolworths has been hit – or so it says – by the state of the economy, noting in its annual report: “Consumer confidence remained historically low as customers reacted adversely to rising utility costs, interest rate hikes in the first half of the year and general global uncertainty, and opted to save rather than spend their money”.
From an investment perspective it is worth noting that retail investors now have a choice of supermarkets, with Coles improving its offering to consumers and taking market share from the incumbent Woolworths.
The investment community is not convinced that further changes to private-label offerings or more innovation around the supply chain will make a dramatic difference to the growth prospects for Woolworths, which set below forecast growth in household income, population and the economy.
One other source of earnings growth is cost-cutting, but the reality is that gains from such strategies are one-offs and again unlikely to excite investors.
Having presented the negatives – which have caused the share price to fall 12% since July, one positive was the strategy briefing’s opportunity to showcase new CEO Grant O’Brien, who replaces Michael Luscombe. The company announced that it planned to extend and defend its leadership in food and liquor, act on the “portfolio” to maximise shareholder value, maintain its track record of building new growth businesses (we’ll ignore Dick Smith) and finally, put in place the enablers for a new era of growth.
In the supermarkets business WOW hopes to grow fresh produce from 28% market share to 36% market share. If achieved this would be an additional $2.5b in sales. Woolies also wants to target a doubling of home brand sales and this aim flies in the face of the ACCC’s stated concerns.
The company will also open 35 new BIG W stores in next 5 years reaching 200 by 2016.
In a reflection of the massive structural shift online, BIG W’s 85,000 in-store SKUs will be expanded and all put online.
And the topic on the tip of everyone’s tongue; Masters. There are now five stores open, another two are due to open in December/January, there are 16 under construction another 100 in the pipeline and the company reported the venture is well ahead of budget.
I also note the advertised sale of $900 million of property ($380 million of which was sold last financial year); and, most recently, the oversubscribed $500 million hybrid note raising that substantially extend the balance sheet strength of the company.
Below we examine the intrinsic value track record and prospects for Woolworths based on current expectations for earnings growth and returns on equity using Skaffold.com
Woolworths (MQR: B2) is currently trading at the same price it was in December 2006 and February 2007, despite the fact profits have risen 11.1% pa, from $1.3 billion to a forecast $2.2 billion in 2012. This growth in profit however is offset by having 16 million more shares on issue; by increased borrowings – up $1.8 billion to $4.8 billion; and by retained earnings, which have risen by $2 billion. The increase in shares on issue and retained earnings have offset the positive impact on return on equity rising profit would normally have.
The latest estimate of its intrinsic value, of $23.23, is forecast to rise modestly over the next two years. For investors looking at opportunities to investigate only when a meaningful discount to intrinsic value is presented, a price of $19 or less for Woolworths would represent at least 20 per cent.
Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 17 November 2011.
You don’t normally expect to get investment tips from a mothers’ group get-together, but that’s what happened to me recently when the conversation turned to retail operations.
Relaxing with a glass of pinot gris the women, who have met regularly for a decade, were explaining why they spend less time in Harvey Norman stores than they used to. Why? Tired stores, tired layouts and uncompetitive prices have served the retailer only with the need to revamp its entire offering. And that, it hasn’t done.
Retailing in Australia has been in the eye of a perfect storm for some time. As I’ve written previously, the strong Australian dollar has encouraged overseas travel and online purchases from overseas businesses; and the two-speed economy has ensured that credit growth (the borrowing of more money to buy stuff) is muted.
I’ve always been suspicious of a company that issues a report to the market after the close of trade. On Monday 31 October, a major retail business in Australia did just that. After closing time, Harvey Norman released its sales and earnings for the first quarter of the 2012 financial year. Given its timing, the announcement was almost certain to be negative. Indeed, the stock fell 4% the next day.
Instead of focusing on the retailing offer, refreshing store designs and improving range, company representatives focus on property, horse racing (Gerry Harvey is one of the country’s biggest bloodstock owners), goading the Reserve Bank of Australia to cut rates in “the national interest” and campaigning to have Australians pay GST on items they buy overseas for less than $1000.
Harvey Norman’s first-quarter sales were down 3.8%, as were like-for-like sales. In Australia, like-for-like sales were down 2.8%, in New Zealand down 10.6%, down 8.9% in Slovenia and down 11.1% in Northern Ireland. A stronger currency against the New Zealand dollar, the Euro and the pound has exacerbated the results. Profit before tax – a very important measure to us when estimating intrinsic value – was down by … wait for it, 19.3%!
Harvey Norman claims the strong Australian dollar and the closure of 34 Clive Peeters stores contributed to the poor result. I would argue that a failure to reinvent the offering also contributed. More worryingly, this latter factor is unlikely to go away any time soon.
Compounding this problem is the very likely scenario that the declining iron ore price – recently at about $115 a tonne – will seriously crimp margins for the only sector that has been running at full capacity in this country. Australia’s stock market has become the tail that wags the dog. Its wealth-effect on Australians and the impact on sentiment are important determinants of activity and in particular, retail activity.
With the All Ordinaries index dominated by resource companies and financial services companies it is possible, if not probable, that a declining iron ore price leads to lower stock prices and lower economic activity. I am no economist, but I can understand some experts’ calls for further rate cuts.
Back to Harvey Norman, and like-for-like sales declines of 2.8% compares favourably with JB Hi-Fi’s decline of 3.5%. Indeed, if it became a trend, one would argue Harvey Norman is winning back market share from JB Hi-Fi.
But before you get too excited about this comparison, you have to realise JB Hi-Fi’s profits are higher than they were last year and last year’s profits were higher than the year before that. In Harvey Norman’s case, profits before tax are down 19.3% compared to the same time last year, and last year first-half profits were down 16.5% from the year before that! One retail analyst I know and respect made the point that at this rate Harvey Norman will produce an average profit slightly ahead of the first-half profit made back in 2004, when it generated sales revenue of 62% of today’s sales.
My intrinsic value estimate for Harvey Norman is about $2.00 a share against today’s share price of $2.17. However this is based on earnings per share of 23¢ for 2012 and that is, quite possibly, optimistic. Over the next few weeks, analysts will bring their earnings after tax estimates down for 2012 materially. This will have a negative impact on intrinsic values and I suspect we will discover a price above $2 is a premium to intrinsic value. Most interestingly, for followers of any rational approach to calculating intrinsic value, Harvey Norman’s updated intrinsic value is no higher today than it was nine years ago, in 2003.
This can be seen in the following chart, which plots the share price of Harvey Norman against its estimated intrinsic value. Generally, we look for companies that have a demonstrated track record of rising intrinsic values and are available at a large discount to the current year’s intrinsic value (see 2006 in the graph).
The lack of any real change in intrinsic value and prices (which follow intrinsic value in the long run) reflects the maturation of the business. You can see that in the short run (in 2007 and again in 2009-2011) prices can get ahead of themselves thanks to many factors including irrational exuberance.
In the long run, however, the market’s weighing machine will do its thing and prices generally revert to intrinsic value. That’s why having a rational method for estimating intrinsic value is so important!
The forecast change in intrinsic value may also decline now that Harvey Norman has provided lower guidance. And it’s not unusual for analyst forecasts to be “hockey-stick” optimistic at the commencement of the financial year.
But long-term, Harvey Norman is a mature business in a small country and it continues to swim upstream against the online retailing avalanche. This is a structural shift rather than a short-term trend and Harvey Norman will need to respond by convincing Australian women in mothers’ groups all round the country that it is fresh, new and competitive.
Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 17 November 2011.
Roger Montgomery speaks to Ross Greenwood about his new stock market product Skaffold. listen
