Monthly Archives: November 2011

In 1979, just like today, many thought equities were finished. Investors in Credit Corp, Flight Centre, Northern Star and many more top stocks would disagree. Read Roger’s article at www.eurekareport.com.au.

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A good friend who lives and works in the UK recently sent me an allegory that succinctly describes, for those who haven’t read Michael Lewis, the growth of sub-prime loans, the collateralised debt obligations into which they were securitised and the credit default swaps which were the tradable insurance contracts on the CDO’s.  It then goes on to neatly leave us with the consequences.

If you have seen it before or believe you have a solid understanding of the events, you are many steps ahead of most.  For the rest of us,

Heidi provides an explanation;

Heidi is the proprietor of a bar … She realises that virtually all of her customers are unemployed alcoholics and, as such, can no longer afford to patronise her bar. To solve this problem, she comes up with a new marketing plan that allows her customers to drink now, but pay later.

Heidi keeps track of the drinks consumed on a ledger (thereby granting the customers loans). Word gets around about Heidi’s “drink now, pay later” marketing strategy and, as a result, increasing numbers of customers flood into Heidi’s bar.  Soon she has the largest sales volume for any bar in Manchester…

By providing her customers freedom from immediate payment demands, Heidi gets no resistance when, at regular intervals, she substantially increases her prices for wine and beer, the most consumed beverages. Consequently, Heidi’s gross sales volume increases massively.

A young and dynamic manager at the local bank recognizes that these customer debts constitute valuable future assets and increases Heidi’s borrowing limit. He sees no reason for any undue concern because he has the debts of the unemployed alcoholics as collateral!

At the bank’s corporate headquarters, expert traders figure a way to make huge commissions, and transform these customer loans into DRINKBONDS. These “securities” then are bundled and traded on international securities markets.

Naive investors don’t really understand that the securities being sold to them as ‘AAA Secured Bonds’ really are debts of unemployed alcoholics.  Nevertheless, the bond prices continuously climb – and the securities soon become the hottest-selling items for some of the nation’s leading brokerage houses.

One day, even though the bond prices still are climbing, a risk manager at the original local bank decides that the time has come to demand payment on the debts incurred by the drinkers at Heidi’s bar. He so informs Heidi. Heidi then demands payment from her alcoholic patrons.  But, being unemployed alcoholics they cannot pay back their drinking debts. Since Heidi cannot fulfil her loan obligations she is forced into bankruptcy.  The bar closes and Heidi’s 11 employees lose their jobs.

Overnight, DRINKBOND prices drop by 90%. The collapsed bond asset value destroys the bank’s liquidity and prevents it from issuing new loans, thus freezing credit and economic activity in the community. The suppliers of Heidi’s bar had granted her generous payment extensions and had invested their firms’ pension funds in the BOND securities. They find they are now faced with having to write off her bad debt and with losing over 90% of the presumed value of the bonds. Her wine supplier also claims bankruptcy, closing the doors on a family business that had endured for three generations, her beer supplier is taken over by a competitor, who immediately closes the local plant and lays off 150 workers.

Fortunately though, the bank, the brokerage houses and their respective executives are saved and bailed out by a multibillion dollar no-strings attached cash infusion from the government. The funds required for this bailout are obtained by new taxes levied on employed, middle-class, non-drinkers who have never been in Heidi’s bar.

Its nicely articulated don’t you think?  Fortunately the problem is contained to…Earth.  But where too next?

Postscript:  This week, China’s vice-premier and head of finance, Wang Qishan, predicted that the global economy has commenced a long-term recession. He observed: “Now the global economic situation is extremely serious and in such a time of uncertainty the only thing we can be sure of is that the world economic recession caused by the international crisis will last a long time.”

Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 25 November 2011.

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The Reject Shop is cheap but not good value. Read Roger’s article at www.eurekareport.com.au.

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Roger Montgomery speaks to Ross Greenwood about his thoughts on Bluescope Steel. Listen

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When Sean Connery played James Bond in the 1967 hit, You Only Live Twice one doubts he had this week’s billion dollar covered bond issue of ANZ in mind.  Asking the question “what is a covered bond?” reveals an extra life has been given to borrowers at the expense of prudent savers.  Its Australia’s own little moral hazard.

moral hazard n.- a situation in which a party insulated from risk behaves differently from how it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk.

According to the Treasurer, Wayne Swan, legislation the government passed last month will strengthen the local financial system, increase the supply of credit, and provide cheaper, more stable and longer-term funding.

ANZ this week issued $US1.25 billion of five-year covered bonds.  CBA is looking to Europe for its issue while Westpac and NAB are said to be eyeing the US debt markets for theirs ahead of increases in wholesale funding costs on their upcoming refinancing.

When banks issue covered bond they pay a lower rate on their funding than if they issued senior unsecured debt.  And if as some commentators suggest the banks in aggregate issue $100 billion of this stuff in coming years the savings can amount to more than half a billion in interest expenses.

The lower rate that banks enjoy on covered bonds is partly due to the AAA rating they receive.  This AAA rating (which is higher than the AA rating the banks themselves enjoy) is derived from the fact that banks can use their assets (loans presumably) as collateral for issuing the bonds.  If the bank goes bust, the bond holder as recourse to those assets.

Interestingly (and here’s why they just might be Triple A), if the assets are worthless the bondholder has recourse to the bank itself.  In other words those bond holders get access to your deposit money and those bond holders rank BEFORE you in terms of their right to your money.

Unsurprisingly, the size of the covered bond market is therefore capped.  Banks can only issue covered bonds backed by up to 8 per cent of their assets. Based on the majors’ full year results, the ANZ, CBA, WBC and NAB have a collective $2.686 trillion in assets.  Eight percent of those assets amounts to $214.9 billion.

Many believe that the issues in Europe are contained to Europe.  Someone wriley observed recently however that debt crises are only contained to planet earth.  Investors like central banks who are limited to investing in AAA rated securities will no doubt be interested in the paper because our banks are perceived as safe.  But what is that assumption based on? We’ll leave that discussion for your comments below.

What I am most interested in is the unilateral decision to allow that which has previously not been permitted; To rank a bond holder ahead of you in terms of rights to your deposits.

On the flip side, the banks argue that the cheaper funding means you can borrow from them more cheaply – assuming they pass it on of course.  But like the ladies in James Bond’s bath, its all part of the policy drive in this country to make things cheap.  Cheaper cars at the expense of local manufacturing, cheaper flights at the expense of local jobs, cheaper food at the expense of local farmers and cheaper bonds at the expense of your entitlement to your deposit.

Keep prices down and there won’t be an uprising.  Have a good weekend.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 18 November 2011.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Financial Services, Insightful Insights.

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On Wednesday November 2 Woolworths held a strategy briefing for professional investors. Woolworth’s effectively asked us to adopt a longer time frame before judging its performance and revealed four strategic priorities that I will describe in a moment.

Prior to the strategy day, the company updated the stock market with a growth outlook that was the lowest in a decade. The market responded negatively to the change and it entrenched previous sentiment by professional investors to switch from Woolworths to Coles.

But Woolworths remains a superior business from a business economics perspective, with high return on equity and it also remains cheaper than its competitor as measured by the larger discount to an estimate of its intrinsic value.

The wider sentiment towards Woolworths Supermarkets is that the period of strong growth is over, and the other businesses, such as Big W, the New Zealand supermarkets, the Masters hardware venture and a possible acquisition of The Warehouse group could be the focus of earnings growth for the company. Gambling pre-committments would not be.

Meanwhile, the Woolworths-owned Dick Smith electronics business appears to have failed to excite consumers and has certainly failed to excite investment professionals. Dick Smith is a relatively weak offering in a market that has been hit particularly hard by the empowerment of the consumer through high Australian dollar.

Moreover, in many ways these businesses are peripheral since the Australian Food & Liquor division accounts for 80% of earnings before interest and tax.

The impact of the company’s lower growth profile on intrinsic value, particularly intrinsic values over the next two years, has been negative and intrinsic value does not appear to be going anywhere in a great hurry (see Skaffold chart below).

This combination of circumstances, in my experience, set Woolworths shares up to be vulnerable to any negative shocks.

Estimating intrinsic value is not the same as predicting price direction, however the above circumstances are not unique historically in putting a lead on price appreciation.

On top of the above combination of factors, there is also the continuing debate in Parliament about the introduction of preset loss limits for poker machines, which, if introduced, would negatively impact Woolworths’ gaming business. Though it is most closely associated with supermarkets, Woolworths is actually the largest poker machine owner in the country, with more than 10,700 pokies.

And a few weeks ago, The Economic Times of India also reported that Woolworths appears to have been dumped by its Indian partner, Tata Group. Woolworths enjoyed a five-year partnership with Tata, introducing Dick Smith-style electronics stores to India under the Infiniti Retail brand. Even though foreign retailers are not permitted to have a direct presence in India, Woolworths partnership offered the hope of growth – albeit with a partner – if the rules were ever relaxed.

Nonetheless, despite these accumulative negative factors, Woolworths is regarded by conventional analysts and investors as a defensive’ company. Its strong cash flows and its status as a major retailer of food makes it an ideal investment in a recessionary or slow or low growth environment. The company also enjoys entrenched competitive advantages over smaller rivals that, until now, the ACCC has done little about. One example of this are the new EFTPOS charges.

From the first of this month, the new Eftpos Payments Australia Limited (EPAL) fees mean retailers incur a 5¢ fee for every transaction over $15 (75% of all EFTPOS transactions). Previously there was no fee and that will still be the case for transactions under $15, which means 25% of transactions.

The retailer’s bank will charge the retailers, some of whom are describing the charges as an “EFTPOS tax”, and they will have no choice but to pass on to the consumer.

Unsurprisingly, EPAL’s members include the major banks, Coles and Woolworths and, because they manage their own terminals, they can opt out of the new charges.

But despite these entrenched advantages, Woolworths has been hit – or so it says – by the state of the economy, noting in its annual report: “Consumer confidence remained historically low as customers reacted adversely to rising utility costs, interest rate hikes in the first half of the year and general global uncertainty, and opted to save rather than spend their money”.

From an investment perspective it is worth noting that retail investors now have a choice of supermarkets, with Coles improving its offering to consumers and taking market share from the incumbent Woolworths.

The investment community is not convinced that further changes to private-label offerings or more innovation around the supply chain will make a dramatic difference to the growth prospects for Woolworths, which set below forecast growth in household income, population and the economy.

One other source of earnings growth is cost-cutting, but the reality is that gains from such strategies are one-offs and again unlikely to excite investors.

Having presented the negatives – which have caused the share price to fall 12% since July, one positive was the strategy briefing’s opportunity to showcase new CEO Grant O’Brien, who replaces Michael Luscombe. The company announced that it planned to extend and defend its leadership in food and liquor, act on the “portfolio” to maximise shareholder value, maintain its track record of building new growth businesses (we’ll ignore Dick Smith) and finally, put in place the enablers for a new era of growth.

In the supermarkets business WOW hopes to grow fresh produce from 28% market share to 36% market share. If achieved this would be an additional $2.5b in sales. Woolies also wants to target a doubling of home brand sales and this aim flies in the face of the ACCC’s stated concerns.

The company will also open 35 new BIG W stores in next 5 years reaching 200 by 2016.

In a reflection of the massive structural shift online, BIG W’s 85,000 in-store SKUs will be expanded and all put online.

And the topic on the tip of everyone’s tongue; Masters. There are now five stores open, another two are due to open in December/January, there are 16 under construction another 100 in the pipeline and the company reported the venture is well ahead of budget.

I also note the advertised sale of $900 million of property ($380 million of which was sold last financial year); and, most recently, the oversubscribed $500 million hybrid note raising that substantially extend the balance sheet strength of the company.

Below we examine the intrinsic value track record and prospects for Woolworths based on current expectations for earnings growth and returns on equity using Skaffold.com

Woolworths (MQR: B2) is currently trading at the same price it was in December 2006 and February 2007, despite the fact profits have risen 11.1% pa, from $1.3 billion to a forecast $2.2 billion in 2012. This growth in profit however is offset by having 16 million more shares on issue; by increased borrowings – up $1.8 billion to $4.8 billion; and by retained earnings, which have risen by $2 billion. The increase in shares on issue and retained earnings have offset the positive impact on return on equity rising profit would normally have.

The latest estimate of its intrinsic value, of $23.23, is forecast to rise modestly over the next two years. For investors looking at opportunities to investigate only when a meaningful discount to intrinsic value is presented, a price of $19 or less for Woolworths would represent at least 20 per cent.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 17 November 2011.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Companies, Consumer discretionary, Insightful Insights, Investing Education, Skaffold.

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You don’t normally expect to get investment tips from a mothers’ group get-together, but that’s what happened to me recently when the conversation turned to retail operations.

Relaxing with a glass of pinot gris the women, who have met regularly for a decade, were explaining why they spend less time in Harvey Norman stores than they used to. Why? Tired stores, tired layouts and uncompetitive prices have served the retailer only with the need to revamp its entire offering. And that, it hasn’t done.

Retailing in Australia has been in the eye of a perfect storm for some time. As I’ve written previously, the strong Australian dollar has encouraged overseas travel and online purchases from overseas businesses; and the two-speed economy has ensured that credit growth (the borrowing of more money to buy stuff) is muted.

I’ve always been suspicious of a company that issues a report to the market after the close of trade. On Monday 31 October, a major retail business in Australia did just that. After closing time, Harvey Norman released its sales and earnings for the first quarter of the 2012 financial year. Given its timing, the announcement was almost certain to be negative. Indeed, the stock fell 4% the next day.

Instead of focusing on the retailing offer, refreshing store designs and improving range, company representatives focus on property, horse racing (Gerry Harvey is one of the country’s biggest bloodstock owners), goading the Reserve Bank of Australia to cut rates in “the national interest” and campaigning to have Australians pay GST on items they buy overseas for less than $1000.

Harvey Norman’s first-quarter sales were down 3.8%, as were like-for-like sales. In Australia, like-for-like sales were down 2.8%, in New Zealand down 10.6%, down 8.9% in Slovenia and down 11.1% in Northern Ireland. A stronger currency against the New Zealand dollar, the Euro and the pound has exacerbated the results. Profit before tax – a very important measure to us when estimating intrinsic value – was down by … wait for it, 19.3%!

Harvey Norman claims the strong Australian dollar and the closure of 34 Clive Peeters stores contributed to the poor result. I would argue that a failure to reinvent the offering also contributed. More worryingly, this latter factor is unlikely to go away any time soon.

Compounding this problem is the very likely scenario that the declining iron ore price – recently at about $115 a tonne – will seriously crimp margins for the only sector that has been running at full capacity in this country. Australia’s stock market has become the tail that wags the dog. Its wealth-effect on Australians and the impact on sentiment are important determinants of activity and in particular, retail activity.

With the All Ordinaries index dominated by resource companies and financial services companies it is possible, if not probable, that a declining iron ore price leads to lower stock prices and lower economic activity. I am no economist, but I can understand some experts’ calls for further rate cuts.

Back to Harvey Norman, and like-for-like sales declines of 2.8% compares favourably with JB Hi-Fi’s decline of 3.5%. Indeed, if it became a trend, one would argue Harvey Norman is winning back market share from JB Hi-Fi.

But before you get too excited about this comparison, you have to realise JB Hi-Fi’s profits are higher than they were last year and last year’s profits were higher than the year before that. In Harvey Norman’s case, profits before tax are down 19.3% compared to the same time last year, and last year first-half profits were down 16.5% from the year before that! One retail analyst I know and respect made the point that at this rate Harvey Norman will produce an average profit slightly ahead of the first-half profit made back in 2004, when it generated sales revenue of 62% of today’s sales.

My intrinsic value estimate for Harvey Norman is about $2.00 a share against today’s share price of $2.17. However this is based on earnings per share of 23¢ for 2012 and that is, quite possibly, optimistic. Over the next few weeks, analysts will bring their earnings after tax estimates down for 2012 materially. This will have a negative impact on intrinsic values and I suspect we will discover a price above $2 is a premium to intrinsic value. Most interestingly, for followers of any rational approach to calculating intrinsic value, Harvey Norman’s updated intrinsic value is no higher today than it was nine years ago, in 2003.

This can be seen in the following chart, which plots the share price of Harvey Norman against its estimated intrinsic value. Generally, we look for companies that have a demonstrated track record of rising intrinsic values and are available at a large discount to the current year’s intrinsic value (see 2006 in the graph).

The lack of any real change in intrinsic value and prices (which follow intrinsic value in the long run) reflects the maturation of the business. You can see that in the short run (in 2007 and again in 2009-2011) prices can get ahead of themselves thanks to many factors including irrational exuberance.

In the long run, however, the market’s weighing machine will do its thing and prices generally revert to intrinsic value. That’s why having a rational method for estimating intrinsic value is so important!

The forecast change in intrinsic value may also decline now that Harvey Norman has provided lower guidance. And it’s not unusual for analyst forecasts to be “hockey-stick” optimistic at the commencement of the financial year.

But long-term, Harvey Norman is a mature business in a small country and it continues to swim upstream against the online retailing avalanche. This is a structural shift rather than a short-term trend and Harvey Norman will need to respond by convincing Australian women in mothers’ groups all round the country that it is fresh, new and competitive.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 17 November 2011.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Consumer discretionary, Insightful Insights, Investing Education, Skaffold.

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Roger Montgomery speaks to Ross Greenwood about his new stock market product Skaffold. listen

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Among nano caps. Embelton Limited stands out even though its too small to attract broker research. Read Roger’s article at www.eurekareport.com.au.

by Roger Montgomery Posted in Media Room, On the Internet.

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Amid all the talk of GFC II and the Eurozone unravelling, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK/A) has been increasing its stake in US bank, Wells Fargo & Co (WFC – 420 Montgomery Street San Francisco).

Buffett (or was it Todd Combs?) topped up Berkshire’s holdings in the world’s 24^th biggest bank by 9.7 million shares in the three months to June 2011 (we don’t have more recent information because Berkshire requested and was granted permission to withhold stock specific information).  Between 1 March and 30 June – the three months during which the stake was increased – Wells Fargo traded as high as $33 and as low as $27.

WFC currently trades at $25.65 and its book value is $26.10 per share. Paying a small discount to book value for a bank that earns a return of 11.86 per cent on that book value doesn’t seem like a fantastic bargain and paying a premium to book value is perhaps less so.  But the fact remains one of the best investors of our generation, reckons it is ok to be selectively buying US banks.  Is Buffett going to make off with a bank fortune the way Butch Cassidy did or will he be caught red handed this time?  Should you be doing the same as Buffett with Australian Banks?

Wells Fargo is the biggest U.S. home lender (think Commonwealth Bank) and Berkshire is its biggest shareholder.  Given Berkshire’s interest in Wells Fargo and Bank of America should be taking a look at our own Banks?

I know there are conflicting and well-articulated opinions here at the blog about the banks, so feel free to add your own thoughts.

Here are mine.

Broadly, the local banking system is in a relatively strong position compared to peers globally.  The funding, capital and liquidity position of the major banks has been strengthened and those who fear a housing collapse in Australia should be mindful that such an event would impact consumer confidence and credit growth more than the immediate profits of the banks, who have insured their exposure.

From a funding perspective, bank deposit growth has outstripped lending growth and while further increases in wholesale funding costs could reasonably be expected, the banks are ahead of schedule in raising term wholesale funding that is said to provide 6 months grace. Of course if deposits continue to grow faster than loans, the gap that is funded from overseas wholesale markets diminishes.

As I have previously noted, high levels of leverage at the consumer, company and country level simply take time to pay off.  You just don’t go off spending aggressively again until you feel your debt is under control.  As a result, it is reasonable to expect bank balance sheet expansion will be muted over the next year or two at least. Some of you may think even longer or permanently…

Globally, the banking picture is at the very least, interesting to watch. The five biggest US banks excluding bank of America posted 8 per cent profit growth, while in the UK the five majors posted H1’11 profits that were half of those reported the year before.  Predictably this has resulted in announcements of an intended five billion Sterling cost cutting drive by 2014.  In Europe, the largest ten banks saw profits fall less than 8 per cent.  Curiously some observers suggest that the present problems befalling sovereigns will have less of an impact on banks than the GFC because sovereign debt is less complex than credit default swaps on collateralized debt obligations and stress testing has been completed and widely reported. With little exposure to European debt and strong growth domestically, Asian banks (with the exception of Japan) are the one bright spot.

Globally, banks are targeting cost to income ratios of less than 40 per cent despite the higher costs associated with reengineering systems and procedures to meet a heightened regulatory environment.

Locally, our major banks have posted more than acceptable profits considering global financial conditions and local consumer and business sentiment, which has remained muted

Growth has been achieved at least partly by the reduction in the provision for bad and doubtful debts.  Additionally, the reduction in the aggregate loan impairment charge was 37%; from $8.4 billion to $5.3 billion.

While significant reductions in loan impairment charges can be seen as a positive, future growth in profits – in the absence of a recovery in consumer and business confidence – will have to come from cost cutting.

Collectively, cost cutting is being reflected in some results – cost to income ratios improved for the CBA and NAB and less so for the ANZ and Westpac.  Further improvements should be expected and I have been reliably informed to expect significant retrenchments – in the thousands – in the financial services sector, even though full time employees increased at the ANZ and CBA last year.  The changes in cost to income ratios should also be seen in the light of the dramatic reductions achieved since the early nineties when cost to income ratios were; ANZ 74%, WBC 68%, CBA 67% and NAB 57%.

Net interest margins – the net margin earned or the difference between interest paid on deposits and interest earned on loans – were broadly unchanged and while the CBA recorded an improvement, this has not been widely reported elsewhere as being materially due to an accounting reclassification of net swap costs.  Competition for retail deposits and higher-cost, post-GFC funding as well as regulatory changes forcing an increase in liquid assets put pressure on margins.  A broad maintenance of margins is therefore laudable.

The banking industry’s preferred measure of profit is Cash Profit (after tax), which removes the impact of discontinued operations, adjustments for acquisitions, Treasury shares and fair value adjustments.

On this measure, all the banks posted healthy increases.

The ANZ increased profits from $5.1 to $5.6, the CBA $6.1 to $6.8, NAB $4.6 to $5.5 and Westpac from $5.9 to $6.3.

Non-interest income, which includes trading, fees & commissions and Wealth management & insurance (which includes life insurance, superannuation and investment management products), declined in aggregate.  Fees & commissions across the major banks were largely steady at just under $12 billion due to a drop in lending offset by an increase in corporate M&A.  Wealth management profits fell for all the banks bar Westpac (BT).  Profits here are largely a function of equity market performance given the big brand’s focus on index hugging and fund inflows/outflows.  Funds under management and administration grew only for the CBA.

The outlook for Australian banks will remain mired by the general ‘funk’ Australian consumers and business are in.  Our one-cylinder economy is not going to spur rapid balance sheet expansion (read credit growth) for the banks in the near term.  With property prices and volumes in some areas also depressed the number of mortgages and the size of a loan on any individual property is necessarily lower.  Banks love mortgages the most because their perceived lower risk means the banks have to provision less for each one they write.  You are welcome to discuss your views about the direction of property in Australia in the comments below and I would welcome your thoughts.  I think that we shouldn’t expect any immediate recovery in property activity to spur bank balance sheet expansion.

With the details broadly out of the way what are the current estimated valuations and prospects for intrinsic value growth for each of the banks?  Keep in mind the intrinsic value expectations for the next three years are based on earnings growth and equity figures as stated in the table included with this column.

Skaffold’s (www.Skaffold.com) current estimated intrinsic values for the banks are: WBC $22.12, ANZ $24.49, CBA $51.54 and NAB $27.69.  Of course these will change over the next weeks and months as estimates are updated and the banks make announcements about prospects, acquisitions or capital raisings etc. and I may not update those details here at the Insights Blog.

The bank displaying the greatest estimated margin of safety currently is ANZ, which at the current price, is displaying an estimated safety margin of 16%.  Of the others NAB appears to be next, with an estimated margin of safety of 11%, WBC 5% and CBA 3%.

Despite being second on this list, the NAB has produced the lowest returns on equity and assets but also the lowest cost to income ratio, second highest Net interest margin and the highest forecast earnings per share growth for the next three years.

In aggregate the opportunity to buy at either very large discounts or smaller discounts but with solid growth potential does not appear to be available.  An investor requiring meaningful margins of safety, would demand lower prices before being seriously interested.  I will leave that decision to you after taking personal professional advice of course – from Buffett or your advisor. Growth doesn’t have to be sensational to make attractive returns but in such cases, one should require a large margin of safety to be more certain of a reasonable return.

What are you thoughts about the banks?  Have I missed an angle that you would like to add?  For example do you think the economic growth prospects are bright for the US compared to Australia? What are your estimates for earnings growth and what are your expectations for the residential, agricultural or commercial property market?  I would be delighted to facilitate a discussion on these subjects.

Posted by Roger Montgomery, Value.able author and Fund Manager, 16 November 2011.

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