Believing completely in my valuation model and approach, I now rarely read about “the world’s greatest living investor” Warren Buffett and his legendary investment company Berkshire Hathaway.

But perhaps I should pay more attention? Because it seems that each deal or media appearance is worthy of further scrutiny and the well-reported $US26 billion buyout of railway company Burlington Northern Santa Fe is no exception.

This largest-ever Buffett investment, combined with a strong Australian dollar and a controversial 50-for-1 split of the Berkshire B class shares (which lowers their share price from $US3325 per share to about $US67) makes a back-of-the-envelope valuation of Berkshire Hathaway an interesting exercise.

So, with enthusiasm, I offer my value of Berkshire Hathaway.

The average annual compounded rate of growth in Berkshire’s book value – its equity – is equal to its return on equity. We can thus approximate the true rate of return on equity for Berkshire by examining the actual rate of change in book value.

Post acquisition, intrinsic value will not increase by the attractive rate it has in the past, unless returns on equity of the past can be maintained as the book value of the company continues to expand. The law of large numbers applies here. It is relatively easy to achieve 20% on $1 million – I can think of two stocks right now that will do that for you over the next two years (and I’ll be writing about these companies in the coming weeks for Alan Kohler’s Eureka Report), but achieving 20% on the $US118 billion of book value Berkshire has today will be a lot more difficult. That is why Buffett needs elephants, and elephants at the right price.

In the four or five decades since 1964, book value has grown by a compounded rate of 20.1 percent – a startling effort – and because of the high rate of return on equity that it reflects, each dollar retained has created more than a dollar of long-term market value. That is why the share price of Class A shares now stands at over $US100,000 per share.

But Buffett has always warned that, in the future, the massive amounts of capital at his disposal means that while you and I have a universe of thousands of companies that can have a material positive impact on our wealth, his investment universe is a few hundred at best. He needs elephants, and if he doesn’t get them his return on equity must inevitably fall. Recently return on equity has averaged 7.5%.

In valuing the shares, there is the A-class, which trade at over $US100,000 each, and the B-class, to which I referred earlier. The simplest way for me to convey the value is to estimate an A-Class equivalent valuation. And to cut to the chase, the value – based on an assumed 12% return on equity (optimistic perhaps) – is approximately $US108,000.

Given that the B-class shares, as an investment, are 1/30th the value and are about to be split 50-for-1, the value of them based on the optimistic return on equity is $US72. If, however, you assume that Berkshire Hathaway continues to achieve the average 7.5% returns on equity it has recently, the valuation falls dramatically because Buffett is retaining profits and generating a rate of return on them that is less than I can achieve elsewhere.

In such circumstances, the only price to pay is a discount to the forecast $US82,000 per-share book value of the company – about $35 per post-split B-class share.

By Roger Montgomery, 13 November 2009

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That is the question I have been asked by some investors. Putting aside the many individuals who have written to me to say they have recently had a less than encouraging shopping experience at Myer, meeting with disinterested casually employed staff, it seems there are those who are taking the current price as a signal that a $2.90 valuation is too conservative.

If ‘price’ is what you pay and ‘value’ is what you get, then your job as an investor is simply to pay a lower price than the value you receive. It is essential therefore that your valuation is completely independent of price.

When I bought JB Hi-Fi at $8.50, the valuation was much higher. When I bought Fleetwood at $3.50, the valuation was much higher. Had I taken my cue from the price of Fleetwood and JB Hi Fi, I would have been fearful that the price was correctly reflecting the possibility that the GFC would roll into something much more damaging.

The Myer valuation of $2.90 is based on the facts presented in the prospectus. The only subjective part of the valuation is the selection of the after tax Required Return. If I adopt a 12% required return I get a $2.85 valuation. At 11.5% the valuation is $2.99, at 11% is $3.19 and at 10% is $3.65. You can take your pick.

In any event, even an optimistic Required Return produces a valuation well below the current price and remember, you want to buy shares at big discounts to valuations. I adopt a policy of simply saying I want to buy the very best businesses when they are trading at substantial discounts to even the most conservative valuation. Compromising this standard in the attempt to generate more activity or valuations that are closer to the current price has the effect not of making you more money, but of making you more active!

By Roger Montgomery, 5 November 2009

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On Richard Goncalve’s Market Moves show on the Sky Business Channel last week I mentioned I would estimate a value for Fortescue Metals Group (ASX:FMG). Let me be the first to say that, like IT businesses, companies in the resources sector are notoriously difficult to value. This is not because they are in a fast changing industry whose long term economics are difficult to predict, but because the economics are based on commodity prices that change daily and whose prediction is almost impossible.

Having said that I should offer a caveat; Buffett’s announcement that he is buying the railroad operator Burlington/Santa Fe in a $44 billion deal – his biggest ever – suggests he truly believes that fuel prices are going up a lot. Indeed while higher diesel prices will raise the costs of running trains, it will raise the cost of operating trucks over trains by a factor of four.

But I digress, FMG – based entirely on 2010 consensus analyst forecasts – is worth $1.90 to $2.00. Another caveat – consensus analysts predictions could be wrong.

By Roger Montgomery, 4 November 2009

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Has the market’s enthusiasm eroded all the safety out of buying stocks? I think so. In fact, for a few weeks now I have been saying that there are very few (read 1 or 2) quality stocks that are cheap. Equity markets are now selling off as investors get nervous again and start thinking about risk. It does appear to me that the rally has not been justified by the economic fundamentals, but more about the US economy in a minut

If you don’t already know, I have no use for P/E ratios. Let me explain why.

Suppose three companies each have $10 of equity per share, each returns 20 percent on that equity and each is trading on a P/E of 10, which equates to $20. The only difference is that the first company is paying out 100 percent of its earnings as a dividend, the second is paying out 50 percent and the third is paying no dividends. If you were to assume that you could buy and sell the shares at the same P/E of ten, the first company would return 10 percent per annum over any number of years, the second would return 15 percent and third will return 20 percent per annum. The third is clearly the cheapest and yet all three had the same P/E of 10. P/E’s can’t tell you very much about valu

There are however times when P/E’s are at such extremes that they provide support to my preferred analysis of the spread between price and value. This is one of those occasions and so, without recognising the validity of P/E’s, I will provide those of you who use P/E’s with the fix that you need.

By definition, if the US economy is recovering, then we recently experienced the last month of the US recession. It would be worthwhile examining the P/E ratio for the S&P/500 Index on the previous occasions that represented the last month of a recession.

Let me start by noting that currently, the trailing P/E is 27. This seems extreme and out of nine recessions since 1954, it is the highest trailing P/E at the last month of a recession, with the exception of November 2001. The other eight observations ranged from a trailing P/E of 8.3 in July 1980 to 17.2 in March 1991. Now some of the years in which the P/E’s were very low were also years of very high inflation, but even if those years are removed today’s trailing P/E is comparatively high.

Many of you will correctly point out that it makes no sense to use trailing P/E’s if we are coming out of a recession because the trailing ‘E’ is unusually low. In such situations, analysts focus on forward P/E’s. (Of course you know my view; if P/E’s are nonsense, then forward P/E’s, sector average P/E’s and the like are simply nonsense squared).

Nevertheless, on one-year forward estimates, the P/E ratio is at 16 times. This is the highest it has been since 2003. Even at the peak of October 2007, the forward P/E was about 14 and the highest it has ever been is 15.4 times.

But while it seems that multiples have, in six months, surged from historic lows to all-time highs, and while conventional wisdom would suggest that P/E’s are at levels normally reserved for the late stages of a bull market, there is a counter argument; at market peaks, such as October 2007, analysts are unusually bullish about the future, while after a recession analysts will be overly cautious about their forecasts. The result is low relative forward P/E’s at peaks and apparently high P/E’s coming out of a recession.

Confused? I am. That’s why I don’t use P/E’s, because they try to predict what the predictors will predict.

What do I really think? I think the stock market has got ahead of itself and the high quality businesses that I look at are now trading above their current valuations and are trading at their valuations two years out. Based on trailing and forward P/E’s (did I tell you I can’t stand P/E’s?) the US market has behaved as if it is in the late stages of a recovery and yet there is still debate about whether the recession is over. US inflation at this stage does not appear to be a threat. Indeed Target and Walmart have started their sales early… that sounds like deflation to me. In the US, rent, restaurant prices, airfares and the prices for personal care products, education, household appliances and tools, hardware and outdoor equipment, confectionary and soft drinks are all plunging. For the week of October 23rd, mortgage applications fell 12.3%! And this was on top of a 13.7%(!) slide the week before. On top of the fact that the Federal Reserve’s Beige Book has indicated that consumer spending remains weak. as does residential construction, architectural billings and commercial construction activity, this suggests that the market has cast its shadow too far forwar

Imagine what the US economy would look like without a $2 trillion injection!

By Roger Montgomery, 29 October 2009

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In short, the answer is no. Three years ago Myer was purchased from the Coles Myer Group by a private equity team called TPG/Newbridge. The Myer Family was also involved and together the consortium acquired Myer for $1.4 billion. The group used $400 million of their own money and borrowed the rest.

Before the first anniversary, a very long-term lease on Melbourne’s Bourke Street store was sold for about $600 million, and a clearance sale reduced inventory and netted $160 million. All this additional cash allowed the new owners to reduce debt, pay a dividend of almost $200 million and produced a capital return of $360 million. In other words, before the first year was out the owners had received all of their $400 million outlay back, and arranged a free ride on a business with $3 billion of revenue.

But as a participant in the upcoming float of Myer you are not being invited to pay $1.4 billion, which was 8.5 times the Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT). You are being asked to stump up to $2.9 billion, or more than 11 times forecast EBIT. You are also being asked to replace the vendors as owners and while they know a lot about extracting maximum performance out of department stores, you don’t.

In estimating an intrinsic value for Myer, I have ignored the fact that the balance sheet includes $350 million of acquired goodwill as well as $128 million of capitalised software expenses. I will also ignore the addition of sales made by concession operators “to provide a more appropriate reference when assessing profitability measures relative to sales”, the removal of the incentive payments to retain key staff (not regarded as ongoing costs to the business), costs associated with the gifting of shares to employees and most interestingly, the reversal of a write-off (meaning it has been left in) of $21 million in capitalised interest costs; all regarded as non-recurring.

While ignoring these in my estimate of intrinsic value seems irresponsible, it merely means that whatever number is produced by the calculation, it is going to be higher than it really should be. That’s fine; I just have to ensure a larger margin of safety.

Taking a Net Profit After Tax figure for 2010 of $160 million and assuming a 75 per cent fully-franked dividend payout, I arrive at a return on equity of about 28 per cent on the stated equity of $738 million – equity that could have been higher after the float if $94 million in cash wasn’t also being taken out of retained profits. Using a 13 percent required return I get a valuation of $2.90.

Alternatively, I am buying $738 million of equity that is generating 28%. If I pay the $2.9 billion that is being asked for that equity, or 3.9 times, I have to divide the return on equity by 3.9 times, which produces a simple return on ‘my’ equity of 7.2 per cent. For ‘my’ money it’s just not high enough for the risk of being in the department store business.

And looking into the future, things don’t become dramatically more attractive either. Based on the numbers in the prospectus I estimate the value only rises by 6 per cent per year over the next five years and delivers a value in 2015 of $3.90 – the price being asked today.

In valuing Myer I am not predicting its price. Remember what Benjamin Graham said; In the short run the market is a voting machine.  Shares that are popular can go up a lot even if the value is much lower. In 1999 and 2000 Telstra’s value was less than $3.00 and yet the shares traded around $9.00 for a long time. But Ben Graham also said in the long run the market is a weighing machine. In the long run, Myer’s share price will reflect its value.

So no, I have not changed my view of Myer’s float.  I am going to pass on My piece of Myer.

By Roger Montgomery, 26 October 2009

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What happens when you buy great businesses cheap?

Shares need to be treated as pieces of businesses rather than bits of paper that wiggle up and down on a computer screen. This seems pretty rational and yet professional investors might buy a company that is a manufacturer of pet rocks loaded with debt because its inclusion in the portfolio reduces its overall volatility.

The same professional might not buy shares of a great business when they are truly cheap, having instead to wait until the shares have risen sufficiently to cause them to be included in the S&P/ASX 200. Buying shares this way, or simply buying in the hope they will rise, is not the same as buying a piece of a business.

The purchase of shares on the baseless hope of a capital gain is no different to betting on black or red at the casino.

Perhaps, because it is seen as too difficult, few investors simply purchase at attractive prices, a portfolio of 10 – 20 great businesses. This is despite the fact that such an approach produces substantial outperformance.[1]

To prove that quality counts, back in the June 2009 issue of Money Magazine I listed eleven stocks that I believe constitute great businesses – Cochlear, CSL, all four major banks, Realestate.com, Woolworths, Reece, The Reject Shop and Fleetwood.  Their combined return since July 1 has been 30 percent compared to the S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index return of 24 percent. Four of those companies have also risen by more than 40 percent in that time.

In July 2009 I also commenced a portfolio of eight stocks for Alan Kohler’s Eureka Report that included JB Hi-Fi and Platinum Asset Management. An equally weighted portfolio invested in those eight stocks would have risen 27 per cent and Platinum, one of the companies in the portfolio, is up over 53 per cent.

And the shares at the time were not even bargains. Imagine the returns if you had purchased them when they were at significant discounts to their intrinsic values back in February and March this year!

By Roger Montgomery, 26 October 2009

[1] For the year to June 30, 2009, and prior to my resignation, the boutique funds management firm I established, floated and sold, produced a return of +11% for clients with individually managed accounts (IMA). The Listed Investment Company I founded and was Chairman and Chief Investment Officer of produced a return of +3%.  For the same period the S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index produced a negative return of -20.7%.

By Roger Montgomery, 26 October 2009

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Paul from WA asks to value ServCorp.  Don’t get excited, I am not going to make a habit of doing this.

Management have delivered returns on equity in excess of 20% over the past five years. This is desirable given the amount of profits being retained to organically grow equity and fund its expansion plans. The balance sheet is strong with plenty of net cash and the business is generating high quality cash flows.

Because of the recent capital raising of circa $80m to fund an expansion program of around 100 floors, any valuation must contain a caveat that it is subject to the rate of return the company manages to achieve on the incremental equity.

So, watch the capital raising development closely. Up until recently, management has been content to slowly and organically growing the business via the reinvestment of profits to fund the roll out of new floors. I like this and the model appears to have worked, with around 67 floors being opened to date.

The capital raising signals a departure from SRV’s original approach. Management plan on opening ‘at least’ 100 new floors – that’s more than double the current level over the next three to four years.

As with any aggressive growth plan, scalable systems must exist particularly when growth of circa 150% in such a short period of time, needs to be managed.  Always a challenge.

Management believe that they will be able to enter into leases within A-grade properties and new markets at attractive rates, taking advantage of any recovery in economic activity.

If they can deliver returns commensurate with recently reported ROE levels, on a materially expanded equity base, investors should be handsomely rewarded. All bets are off if green shoots fail to germinate.  Remember Servcorp is a cyclical business.

So what is the value?  Without taking into account the profitability of the recent capital raising, the value is $2.39.  I wouldn’t pay much attention to this valuation because if the company can employ the capital it recently raised at previously recorded rates of return, the value is closer to the current price.

By Roger Montgomery, 22 October 2009

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On Your Money Your Call with Nina May on 24 September 2009 I promised to value Worley Parsons.

What is WOR worth? After running my ruler over the business’ historical fundamentals, I estimate WOR is currently valued at $27.44 (2010). The share price is $29.43, making it a little expensive at the moment.

But WOR is a business with attractive underlying long-term investment fundamentals, including an average return on equity of 23%, a modest net gearing level of 33% and bright prospects with ongoing demand for Australia’s resources.

This demand should underpin capital spending programs by our miners in the future and hence the need for engineering companies to continue servicing a market that has grown remarkably over the past 10 years.

WOR is one to add to your watchlist should a more rational share-price present itself.

By Roger Montgomery, 20 October 2009

Update 28 October, 2009

Please keep in mind that for WOR there is a very strong likelihood that the businesses future earnings will be materially impacted by the strong Australian dollar. 25% of Worley’s revenues come from Canada, 24% for the US and latin America, 15% from the Middle east / Asia and 11% from Europe and Africa.

Although many analysts and market commentators currently have concerns about the currency and the headwinds facing earnings, these have to be weighed up against the strong cash flows WOR is generating and the fact it is a leader in its sector globally. Also, a high oil price will be a positive. A high oil price makes previously uneconomical finds profitable and increases revenues for many firms which are already producing. More revenue equals bigger budgets for capital projects. Obviously. Saying this, consensus forecasts have fallen in recent days. This has led to a revision in my valuation to $26.08. This is by no means is a recommendation, merely a discussion about the strengths of the business and also its weaknesses in the face of a higher Australian dollar.

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Dividend stripping involves buying a stock before it goes ex dividend and selling it after. The idea is to pick up the dividend, swapping it for the capital loss (which occurs because the shares usually fall ex dividend by the amount of the dividend). You also get the franking credit, and if the market is strong, you may not get a capital loss at all. If you do get a capital loss, there are tax benefits there too.

Many stocks, particularly the big ones, rally (rise) well in advance of the ex dividend date, so don’t buy the day before. There are also large gains when interest rates are low and when the market is strong, so there is an element of predictability under these conditions.

A warning to eager dividend strippers: If you are going to make more than $5000 in franking credits (equivalent to 5% on $100,000) in the same tax year, you need to appreciate the 45 day rule. In such circumstances you need to own the shares for 45 days, excluding the buy and sell date, to qualify for the franking credits and you can’t hedge away the stock exposure with futures, options or CFD’s.

Usually shares drop by the size of the dividend on the ex dividend date. Because they don’t drop by the dividend and the franking credit’s value, you ‘earn’ the franking credits. International investors, who generally stick to the very large companies, don’t get the benefit of the franking credits so if all goes to plan, they may sell in advance ahead of the dividend (as locals who do receive the franking support the shares) and buy back after the ex dividend date, providing support for the local dividend seller to sell into.

By Roger Montgomery, 17 October 2009

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With a 66% market share, Telstra’s monopolistic powers are in the news and generating quite a stir. The only problem is that the telco’s monopolistic powers are not stirring its profits.

With a 90% share, Telstra dominates what used to be called the ‘local call market’. In the last decade mobile phone services have risen from 8 million to 22 million, internet penetration has risen from 30% to 79% of households, and despite unique anti-syphoning legislation which ensures free-to-air tv gets to show the big sporting events, pay tv has increased to 30% household penetration from virtually nothing in 1995.

Despite this rapid growth in new technology and Telstra’s dominant landline market share, its profits are no higher today than they were ten years ago. And while its intrinsic value has risen slightly in the last two years, it has not registered impressive growth overall.

The ‘rebalancing’ and ‘cannibalisation’ that the industry is experiencing, and the government wants, does not detract from the very high underlying growth factors in the telecommunications industry.

Demand for high-speed services will exceed supply. By 2017 Fibre to the Household (FttH) will make our present broadband look like the dial-up systems of ten years ago and will be used by the telecoms, IT and media industries to deliver digital media services, applications, video content hosting and distribution. Whether Telstra will be able to take advantage of it and win is anyone’s guess.

In fast-changing industries, working out who will dominate is difficult and therefore so is estimating an intrinsic value. In any event, Telstra in its current form has not been able to convert its dominant position and the strong growth in telecommunications demand into improving economic performance. There is little reason to believe that it will in the future.

By Roger Montgomery, 17 October 2009

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